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Chapter Two
Remedies in Administrative Law: A Roadmap to a Parallel Legal Universe
Cristie Ford
Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia
I.

Introduction

The Northern Gateway pipeline saga introduced in this book’s first chapter is a case
study in how administrative law operates in Canada, and the crucially important subjects,
on the border between law and policy, that get decided through administrative law means.
The saga also helps shed light on the role of the courts, vis-à-vis the executive, and in
particular on the kinds of remedies that courts are able to impose.
Gitxaala Nation1 is generally considered at least a qualified victory for the several
First Nations that brought the matter to the Federal Court of Appeal. Gitxaala Nation had
alleged that the federal Crown had failed in its duty to consult and, if necessary, to
accommodate their interests during the Northern Gateway pipeline approval process. A
majority of the Federal Court of Appeal held that they were right: that at key points,
Canada had offered “only a brief, hurried, and inadequate opportunity … to exchange and
discuss information and dialogue,” and that the consultation process fell “well short of
the mark.”2
In many respects, the majority’s decision looks like any appellate decision (albeit a
long one, weighing in at almost 140 pages). It reviews the facts and the decisions reached
below, analyzes the case law, and develops a lengthy set of reasons for deciding in the
way it did. Yet in other ways, it looks different. For example, Gitxaala Nation are styled
as both “appellants”—appealing a National Energy Board decision to issue regulatory
certificates approving key pieces of the pipeline project—and as “applicants” on “judicial
review,” challenging an Order in Council made by the Governor in Council (i.e., federal
Cabinet, or the “GIC”), directing the NEB to issue those certificates. Is there a
meaningful difference between an “applicant” and an “appellant”? How exactly does a
court acquire the authority to oversee the actions of the National Energy Board, or of
federal Cabinet? The Federal Court of Appeal also made observations about its role that
were very different from what any appellate court would normally have made in
reviewing a trial court decision. It said things like, “the Governor in Council is entitled to
a very broad margin of appreciation in making its discretionary decision upon the widest
considerations of policy and public interest.”3

1

2016 FCA 187, [2016] FCJ No 705 (QL).

2

Ibid at para 325.

3

Ibid at para 152.

Perhaps more importantly, although the Gitxaala were seen to have enjoyed a victory,
the remedy they received was confusing. The court did not make a decision about
whether, on its merits, the Northern Gateway pipeline project should proceed. It did not
give it the go-ahead, nor order that it had to be stopped. It did not order sanctions or
money damages against the GIC for proceeding with the project on the basis of what it
had held to be inadequate consultation. Instead, it “quashed” the earlier GIC decision and
sent it back, again to the GIC, for reconsideration. The majority held that Canada would
have to go back and adequately consult with the relevant First Nations, but once it had
done so (something the court did not think would take long) it was apparently free to
continue with the approval process.
None of this seems very familiar or necessarily, at first glance, very satisfactory.
What was going on? Why did this outcome count as a success for the Gitxaala Nation at
all, if it failed to stop the pipeline, imposed no damages, and put the ultimate approval
decision back with the GIC itself? Was this the most they could have hoped for?
Understanding how the remedies operated in this case involves understanding how
administrative law remedies have evolved to be something separate from what we
normally expect from courts—something that recognizes the particular role of
administrative decision-makers, like the GIC and many others, and that draws on a
particular tradition, and a particular understanding of court authority.
Even starting with a court decision as we have done, however, can obscure what goes
on before a party like the Gitxaala get to court. Administrative law does not begin at the
point where a party to an administrative action seeks judicial review of that action
through the courts. The scope of administrative law begins much earlier, and also
encompasses administrative decision-making processes that may take policy into account,
or operate under a different mandate, or that otherwise look quite different from what a
court is likely to produce. Most other tribunals, to be sure, are not as purely political as
the GIC, but nor are they courts.4 Rich forms of action are possible in these forums. A
tight focus on court action thus misses the hugely important first step in real-life
administrative action: the varied and sometimes creative remedies that a tribunal itself
may impose.
Let us, then, start at the beginning. This chapter provides an overview of
administrative law remedies as a whole, including not only judicial review but also frontline tribunal remedies, internal and external appeals, enforcement mechanisms, and
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The GIC is not a tribunal at all, but it is the exception in this chapter. For simplicity I
use the term "tribunal" throughout to refer to the full range of administrative agencies,
commissions, and other bodies, but generally not including Cabinet. This is an
oversimplification, because many administrative decision-makers do not take a tribunal
form. Many administrative decisions are made by bureaucrats without a hearing or the
court-style structure of a tribunal; administrative agencies also regularly make policy
decisions that affect individual and social interests. However, the tribunal is perhaps the
prototypical administrative structure for the purpose of understanding the remedies
available to a party to tribunal action.

extralegal strategies. Discussing remedies near the beginning of an administrative law
textbook may seem unconventional. We have chosen this approach because
understanding the available remedies is an important part of understanding what one is
getting into in administrative law, and it provides a broad structural framework on which
subsequent chapters can build. This chapter is meant to operate almost as a decision tree,
to help guide students through the different stages where remedies issues arise. Figure 3.1
sets out the broad outlines of the chapter.
Figure 3.1

The chapter is divided into three main sections. Section II, "Remedial Options at
the Tribunal Stage," Section III, "Enforcing Tribunal Orders Against Parties," and even
the first part of Section IV, "Challenging Administrative Action" have not traditionally
been located in the "remedies" chapter of administrative law texts (if they appear at all).
As we shall see in Section II, remedial options available to administrative agencies at the
first stage differ from those available to courts and reflect the different composition of
tribunals. The remedies available at the administrative stage are both more limited (in
terms of the tribunal's statute-derived authority to impose them) and, potentially, more
expansive (as a consequence of tribunals' particular expertise and their ability to remain
seized of a matter over time). Section III looks at the ability of a party or tribunal to
enforce a tribunal order against another party, either civilly or criminally. Section IV
considers parties' ability to challenge tribunal action. This includes internal appeal
options, extralegal options, appeal to the courts, and, finally, the classic administrative
law remedy of judicial review (which, as discussed below, is not the same thing as appeal
to the courts). In addressing these three aspects in a single chapter, the goal is to provide
the reader, in a systematic and chronological fashion, with a conceptual frame of

reference that includes the full range of remedial options available to parties before
administrative tribunals.
II.

Remedial Options at the Tribunal Stage

Administrative tribunals are as varied as the topics on which they adjudicate, and it
would be unwise to generalize about the remedial powers available to them. However,
two general comments about available remedies can safely be made. First, because a
tribunal does not have the general jurisdiction that a court does, the power to impose a
particular remedy must be provided for in the tribunal's enabling statute. Whether a
tribunal can order that, for example, money damages be paid, an administrative penalty
be imposed, or an individual be stripped of a licence will depend on the remedial powers
the statute provides to it. Second, most tribunals' composition, structure, and mandates
are different from courts', and their approach to remedies reflects those differences. For
example, certain tribunals' expertise with a more limited subject matter may help them to
identify systemic problems or recurring patterns across multiple individual disputes.
Their ability to stay involved in (that is, to remain "seized" or to “have seizin” of) a
dispute over a longer period of time is well established, and many tribunals are less
constrained by formal rules than courts are in developing remedies. Together, on
occasion, these factors allow tribunals to conceptualize and implement novel remedial
strategies aimed at addressing the systemic problems they see.
A. Statutory Authority
As a creature of statute, a tribunal cannot make orders that affect individuals' rights or
obligations without authority from its enabling statute.5 Therefore, the first step in
determining a tribunal's remedial options is to look at the statute itself. If a tribunal makes
orders outside the scope of its enabling statute, it is exceeding its jurisdiction, and those
orders will be void.6
Many enabling statutes set out express lists of the remedies a tribunal may order. For
example, tribunals often have the power to make declaratory orders, to order a party to
repair a problem or to mitigate damage, or to order a party to comply with the tribunal's
enabling statute. Licensing powers may also be given to tribunals in statutory regimes
designed to protect the public (for example, through professional licensing qualifications
or requirements for corporations issuing securities to public investors), or to manage

5
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Att Gen of Can v Inuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 SCR 735, [1980] SCJ No 99 (QL).

When two tribunals share jurisdiction over a particular statutory provision (e.g., a
workers' compensation tribunal and a human rights tribunal considering a statutory
provision that concerns them both), a tribunal can also be found to exceed its jurisdiction
if it deals with a claim that has already been "appropriately dealt with" by the other
relevant tribunal. See British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011
SCC 52, [2011] 3 SCR 422.

natural resources (for example, fishing and forestry licences). Some tribunals can appoint
conciliators and otherwise assist in settling matters before them.7 Some enabling statutes
empower tribunals to impose significant fines and possible incarceration, or provide for
more serious quasi-criminal offences that must be prosecuted by the Crown.8
Other statutes accord their tribunals broad, discretionary power to fashion the
remedies they see fit. For example, the Ontario Human Rights Code gives the Ontario
Human Rights Tribunal the discretion to order a party who has been found to
discriminate to "do anything that, in the opinion of the tribunal, the party ought to do to
achieve compliance with this Act, both in respect of the complaint and in respect of
future practices."9
Even where a tribunal's remedial power is less certain (that is, its enabling statute
does not expressly permit a particular remedy and the tribunal has no broad discretionary
power), one may try to argue that, as a matter of practical necessity, a tribunal must have
the remedial power to do the things its statute requires it to do.10 However, orders for the
payment of money, such as compensation or damages, fines, fees and levies, and costs,
can generally only be ordered by tribunals that have the express statutory authority to do
so. Tribunals also lack the equitable jurisdiction to order interim injunctions, although
they may be given statutory authority to seek an injunction in court to enforce a statute.
Finally, whether a tribunal has the power to grant remedies under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms11 is a separate question. As Evan Fox-Decent and Alexander
Pless explain in Chapter 13,, a separate test determines whether particular administrative
tribunals can grant remedies under s 24(1) of the Charter.12 Moreover, some provinces
have now enacted statutes that explicitly bar at least some tribunals from considering
Charter issues.13
7

E.g. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, ss 47-48; BC Employment
Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 78.
8

See e.g. BC Securities Act, RSCBC 1996, c 418, s 155.

9

Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 41(1)(a).

10

ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006]
1 SCR 140.
11

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, RSC 1985, app II, no 44.

12

See R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 765.

13

See e.g. the BC Administrative Tribunals Act, 36 SBC 2004, c 45 [ATA], which
provides that the majority of provincial tribunals do not have discretion to consider either
constitutional questions generally, or at least constitutional questions relating to the
Charter. The statute establishes a mechanism for referring constitutional questions to the
courts. Sections 46.1-46.3 of the Act impose similar restrictions on many tribunals'

B. What Makes Administrative Tribunals Unique
Administrative tribunals and agencies vary widely in their structures and functions,
but collectively they also differ from courts in important ways. The particular structures
and qualities of administrative tribunals equally affect the kinds of remedies they are
inclined, and empowered, to grant. This part of the chapter seeks to set out in broad
strokes the kinds of remedies that tribunal-type administrative bodies in particular are
likely to grant. The kinds of functions performed by tribunal-type administrative
bodies—namely, party-on-party dispute resolution, party-versus-agency enforcement and
disciplinary proceedings, and other similar forms of hearings and decision-making—tend
to be the most common ways in which members of the public engage with administrative
bodies. These functions also square especially well with the concept of a "remedy,"
defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "the means by which the violation of a right is
prevented, redressed, or compensated."14
However, the reader should be aware that tribunal-type administrative agencies are
only one version of administrative agency operations. Parties may interact, be answerable
to, and seek to influence administrative law agencies in other ways. Agencies' policymaking functions, in particular, are outside the scope of this chapter but should not be
outside one's field of vision.15 Through their statutory drafting choices, legislators
regularly delegate detailed policy-making decisions to administrative tribunals. Many
larger administrative agencies have formal policy-making departments, which generally
operate at some remove from their tribunal departments. Administrative policy
instruments can range from formal, binding interpretive releases to relatively informal,
non-binding administrative guidance. Policy releases and guidelines have a direct impact
on regulated entities. They are publicly available, and regulated entities are expected to
know about them. Their release can be preceded by formal public consultation, providing
those affected with a chance for input in advance.
Moreover, even when acting in their tribunal capacity, administrative tribunals often
do, and should, take a broader perspective on a dispute than courts necessarily will. One
way to understand the difference is in terms described by an American scholar, Abram
Chayes, in the mid-1970s.16 Chayes talked about courts, not administrative agencies.
Nevertheless, his point illuminates the distinction between the two. Chayes described an
jurisdiction to apply the BC Human Rights Code to any matter before them on the basis
that the Human Rights Tribunal is the more appropriate forum.
14

Black's Law Dictionary, 10th ed., sub verbo "remedy."
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See Chapter 8, Delegation and Consultation: How the Administrative State Functions.
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Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv L
Rev 1281; see also DM Gordon, "'Administrative' Tribunals and the Courts" (1933) 49
LQ Rev 94 (defining a judicial function as one that determines "pre-existing" rights and
liabilities by reference to a "fixed objective standard," as contrasted to an administrative
function, in which rights and liabilities are created by "policy and expediency").

emerging dichotomy between traditional conceptions of adjudication and an emerging
judicial role in what he described as public law litigation. In traditional adjudication, a
suit involves only the private parties before the court. It is self-contained and partyinitiated. A dispassionate judge identifies the private right at issue on the basis of
doctrinal analysis and retrospective fact inquiry. The judge imposes relief, understood as
compensation for the past violation of an identifiable existing right. (This portrayal
describes party-on-party dispute resolution, but this sort of rights-based approach also
underpins tribunal-on-party regulatory action, such as a self-regulatory profession’s
disciplinary proceeding against one of its members.) By contrast, in public law litigation,
Chayes argued that the debate is more focused on the vindication of broader statutory or
constitutional policies. The lawsuit is not self-contained. The judge must manage
complex trial situations involving not only the parties to the dispute but also the many
and shifting parties not before the court who nevertheless may be affected by the suit's
outcome. Fact inquiry is predictive, not retrospective. Through a combination of party
negotiation and continuing judicial involvement, the judge fashions relief that is ad hoc,
ongoing, and prospective. On the Chayes model, judges can become change agents under
whose management specific cases can have far-reaching effects.
Like Chayes's public law adjudicatory model, administrative agencies—even when
acting as tribunals rather than policy-making bodies—may have a broader mandate, and
the ability to leverage a broader range of tools than a traditional assertion of rights-based
claims provides. Chayes’s point was somewhat aspirational when it came to courts, but it
is accurate in describing how at least some tribunals function. Many administrative
bodies are explicitly charged with managing complex and often "polycentric" problems in
a comprehensive manner. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized this, pointing out
that "while judicial procedure is premised on a bipolar opposition of parties, interests, and
factual discovery, some problems [assigned to tribunals by their enabling statutes] require
the consideration of numerous interests simultaneously, and the promulgation of
solutions which concurrently balance benefits and costs for many different parties."17
This has a few implications. First, it means that relative to courts, administrative
tribunals have stronger theoretical justifications for remaining seized of a case over a
longer period of time.18 Second, it means that administrative tribunals may try to develop
remedies that address underlying structural or systemic problems, in a forward-looking

17

Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982
at para 36, [1998] SCJ No 46 (QL); see also Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan
(District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 SCR 5 at paras 17-25; Canada v Kabul Farms Inc, 2016
FCA 143, [2016] FCJ No 480 (QL) at paras 24-25.
18

See e.g. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services) v Ontario (Human Rights Comm)
(2001), 39 CHRR 308 (Ont Sup Ct), aff'd [2004] OJ 5051 (CA) (holding that the Human
Rights Tribunal of Ontario had extensive supervisory jurisdiction over its orders and
could remain seized of a matter to recast its orders to deal with ongoing systemic racism
at correctional facilities).

rather than retrospective, rights-oriented way. This is not to say that courts may not also
sometimes craft systemic, forward-looking remedies. Indeed, Chayes's point is that they
may.19 However, relative to courts, administrative tribunals may be especially well placed
to develop and implement novel remedies thanks to their subject-specific expertise, their
field sensitivity, and their particular statutory mandates.
Just as important, administrative tribunal members are a more diverse group than
judges are, especially in terms of their training and expertise. Many tribunal members are
not legally trained. Some tribunals' enabling statutes stipulate that a certain portion of
their tribunal members should be laypersons. For example, the federal Competition
Tribunal Act20 stipulates that the tribunal shall consist of not more than six members who
are Federal Court judges, and not more than eight other "lay" members. The statute goes
on to say that the Governor in Council should establish an advisory council, "to be
composed of not more than ten members who are knowledgeable in economics, industry,
commerce or public affairs,"21 to advise the Minister of Industry with respect to the
appointment of lay members. The result is a tribunal with substantial expertise in
economics and in commerce.22 The tribunal's expertise also makes it more likely that its
members will devise remedies that reflect their training and perspective, and that may be
more economic than legal.
Sometimes, the composition of tribunal membership reflects an explicit attempt to
represent different interest groups, perhaps especially in subject areas where there is a
perception that judges historically have been unsympathetic or not alive to some of the
issues at stake. A classic example is a tripartite labour board, on which a representative of
labour, a representative of management, and a third member must sit. A further example
of a tripartite structure is the BC Review Board, charged under the Criminal Code23 of
Canada with making dispositions with respect to individuals found unfit to stand trial or
not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder. The BC Mental Health Act24
requires that each panel of the Review Board consist of a doctor, a lawyer, and a person

19

Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR
3, provides justification for structural injunction-style remedies by courts.
20

RSCR 1985, c 19 (2d Supp) s 3(2).

21

Ibid, s 3(3).

22

Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748.
Separately, note that expertise is not only based on qualifications. Tribunal members also
gain expertise through familiarity and experience with their fields.
23

RSC, 1985, c C-46.

24

RSBC 1996, c 288

who is neither a doctor nor a lawyer.25 The kinds of remedies that such boards devise are
likely to reflect the particular priorities and assumptions of its members, and may not be
limited to the set of strictly legal remedies that spring most easily to the legally trained
mind.
Administrative law has also been affected by what is variously called "new public
management" theory, neoliberalism, or administrative structures that "span the public–
private divide." Effectively, these are mechanisms by which public structures, such as
administrative tribunals, retain ultimate accountability for their programs but "outsource"
the implementation of those programs to private or third-party actors. For example,
hundreds of standards developed by private bodies are incorporated into law and used for
enforcement and compliance purposes.26 Regulators also delegate enforcement and
compliance functions to private bodies. For example, the Technical Standards and Safety
Association (TSSA) is a delegated administrative authority for Ontario safety regulation
covering elevating devices, amusement rides, boilers, and other products. The various
provincial securities commissions also delegate the regulation of investment dealers and
mutual fund dealers to their respective self-regulated organizations, the Investment
Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) and the Mutual Fund Dealers
Association (MFDA). Many professionals, including doctors and lawyers, are regulated
in Canada by their self-governing professional bodies, which are not government
agencies.
These are deeply embedded features of Canadian law, especially in fields where there
are highly technical product or process issues to be regulated. They are also controversial,
particularly as their use becomes more widespread and it becomes clear that "technical"
standards are not so easily divorced from larger social and policy considerations.
Proponents of public–private coordination in regulation argue that delegated
implementation is the best way forward for administrative agencies that are otherwise at
risk of being ineffective and out of touch; that it allocates action to those bodies best
equipped and with the greatest information to perform tasks effectively; that public–
private partnerships are capable of accomplishing public ends more efficiently than the
public sector could acting alone; and that such partnerships do not eliminate the public
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RSBC 1996, c 288, s 24.1(3). Additional guidelines on qualifications for part-time
members of the board can be found in "Recruitment, Screening and Appointment
Procedures" (Vancouver: British Columbia Review Board, 2004), online: British
Columbia Review Board
[lt]http://www.bcrb.bc.ca/BCRB%20Recruitment%20Procedures%202011.pdf[gt].
26

For example, since 1927, the Canadian Standards Association's Canadian Electrical
Code, Canadian Standards Association Standard C22.1-06, has provided the standards for
addressing shock and fire hazards of electrical products in Canada. It has been
incorporated by reference into provincial regulations across the country: see e.g.
Electrical Safety Regulation, BC Reg 100/2004, s 20.

state, but rather "save" it from its own bureaucratic flaws.27 Those opposed argue that
these mechanisms are privatization by another name; that they reduce accountability and
the public sector's responsibility for what should be publicly provided goods and
services; and that they "hollow out" the state in potentially irretrievable ways.28 We must
leave this important debate for another day. At a practical level, though, parties to
administrative actions should be aware that a constellation of ostensibly private actors
may play more or less formal roles in real-life public administration.
As well, both tribunal-side and policy-side administrative functions have been
affected by globalization. The effects of globalization mean that domestic administrative
tribunals no longer act entirely free of international and transnational agreements,
organizations, standard-setting bodies, and commitments. Some of the most notable
international examples come out of the European Union, whose policy and harmonization
directives and court decisions have, over the last several decades, had a direct impact on
European nation states' domestic administrative law. In Canada, as well, international
obligations have had an impact on, for example, federal labour policies and their
subsequent administration through a variety of public bodies.29 International human
rights norms have also influenced the substantive review of administrative decisions.30
Relevant international or transnational standards are sometimes set by governments
acting together (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] and its
associated side agreements) and sometimes by independent, private, or non-governmental
bodies filling lacunae in international law (as is the case with forest practices

27

Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law"
(2000) 52 Admin L Rev 813; Richard Stewart, "Administrative Law in the Twenty-First
Century" (2003) 78 NYUL Rev 437.
28

See e.g. Harry Arthurs, "Public Law in a Neoliberal Globalized World: The
Administrative State Goes to Market (and Cries 'Wee, Wee, Wee' All the Way Home)"
(2005) 55 UTLJ 797.
29

Canada, Commission on Labour Standards Review, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour
Standards for the 21st Century (Gatineau: Human Resources and Skills Development
Canada, 2006) at 51-52, online:
[lt]http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/employment_standards/fls/pdf/final_report.pdf[gt].
30

See Chapter 14, The Role of International Human Rights Norms in Administrative
Law.

certification).31 Looking at these developments, some scholars have even begun to herald
the birth of a "global administrative law."32
Thus, the conversation about proper tribunal action spans multiple disciplines—law,
public policy, and organizational and political theory—and it is taking place at the levels
of practice and theory, both within tribunals and with respect to them. The forces that
influence tribunals produce remedies that can be more dynamic and varied than the ones
we are accustomed to seeing in the courts. Courts’ review of administrative action—the
piece of the puzzle that gets so much attention in mainstream Canadian administrative
law courses—is only one facet of administrative law.
C. Systemic Remedies at the Tribunal Level
Some of the factors described above—ongoing seizin, a broad mandate, different
expertise, public–private coordination, and transnational linkages—have led some
tribunals to create innovative remedies. For example, one cluster of innovations
incorporates an independent third party in trying to develop and implement remedial
measures within a subject organization or corporation where systemic problems seem to
be significant. These remedies try to effectuate meaningful systemic change within the
organization through sustained engagement with the problem by an impartial outsider.
They have become fairly common among securities and other corporate regulators in
particular, in the United States and Australia, as well as Canada.33 An important function
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Errol Meidinger, "The Administrative Law of Global Private–Public Regulation: The
Case of Forestry" (2006) 17 EJIL 47.
32

Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, "The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law" (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs 15.
33

In the United States, corporate monitorships have been imposed on dozens of
corporations under the terms of deferred criminal prosecution agreements or regulatory
enforcement settlements. On the effectiveness of corporate monitorships in that context,
see Cristie Ford & David Hess, "Corporate Monitorships and New Governance
Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context" (2011) 33:4 Law & Pol'y 509. The
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission was a pioneer in developing what are
known there as "enforceable undertakings": Christine Parker, "Restorative Justice in
Business Regulation? The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Use of
Enforceable Undertakings" (2004) 67 Mod L Rev 209. Canadian examples include
Settlement Agreement, Mackie Research Capital Corporation, 2010 BCSECCOM 646
(22 November 2010), online:
[lt]http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/comdoc.nsf/0/599572db2a73de48882577ed00618775/$FILE/2
010%20BCSECCOM%20646.pdf[gt]; Settlement Agreement, In the Matter of Union
Securities Ltd and John P Thompson (18 April 2006), online:
[lt]http://docs.iiroc.ca/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=71522FD9816A452F8246B
58D8776B613&Language=fr[gt]; Order, In the Matter of Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited

of the third party in this context is to facilitate a deliberative process within the
organization itself—that is, to help the troubled organization confront and work through
its problems internally. Some scholars argue that transparent, accountable, and broadly
participatory dialogue of this nature, potentially facilitated by such third parties, is the
most legitimate and most effective mechanism for making decisions in complex
organizational structures.34
One effort at creating such a deliberative, third-party facilitated process took place
within Ontario's Ministry of Correctional Services, as a response to a long-standing
human rights complaint by an employee of the Ministry. The complainant in that case,
Michael McKinnon, was a correctional officer of Indigenous ancestry working within the
Ministry of Correctional Services. In 1998, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (then
called the Board of Inquiry) found that Mr. McKinnon suffered discrimination and
harassment at his workplace, the Toronto East Detention Centre, because of his race,
ancestry, and ethnic origin. In response, the tribunal ordered a number of systemic
remedies to address the "poisoned atmosphere" at the facility, Toronto East, and within
Corrections generally. Among other things, the tribunal ordered that certain individual
respondents be relocated, that the tribunal's order be publicized among Corrections
employees, and that a human rights training program be established. The tribunal
reconvened the hearing in 2002 because of Mr. McKinnon's allegations that the poisoned
work environment had not improved. The issue for the tribunal at that point was not
whether the existing systemic remedies had been implemented in a strict sense, but
whether they had been carried out in good faith.
After dealing with the question whether it could remain seized of the matter—finding
that it could, as affirmed later by the Ontario Court of Appeal35—the tribunal ordered an
additional range of remedies, including training for Ministry and Facility management;
establishing a roster of external mediators to deal with discrimination complaints; and
appointing, at the Ministry's expense, an independent third-party consultant nominated by
the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) to develop and oversee the delivery of
training programs. The third-party consultant was to be nominated by the OHRC, to be
paid for by the Ministry, and to report to the tribunal.
What makes these remedies interesting is that they are so different in character from
traditional legal remedies, such as damages (in the civil context) or quashing of Ministry
or Facility decisions (in the administrative law context). This looks like Chayes's public
law litigation model: these remedies are prospective, open-ended, and subject to ongoing
(28 April 2005), online: Ontario Securities Commission
[lt]http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/10499.htm[gt].
34

See e.g. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); but see César A Rodríguez-Garavito,
"Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles
in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico and Guatemala" (2005) Politics & Society 203.
35

Ontario v McKinnon, [2004] OJ No 5051 (QL).

revision and elaboration. The tribunal's remedial orders—the emphasis on training, and
bringing in the expertise of external human rights consultants to work with the Ministry
in developing that training—seem geared less toward redressing the wrongs against Mr.
McKinnon in particular, and more toward effecting wide-ranging, permanent, systemic
change to institutional culture.
The McKinnon case became the longest-running human rights case in Canada but
ultimately, after a protracted and difficult run, it had a somewhat happy ending. As of
May 2005, the parties were still arguing over the scope of the third-party consultant's
responsibilities, with the consultant alleging that the Ministry was attempting to gain
control over the process. The process of defining the consultant's mandate seemed itself
to have become an adversarial contest that did not bode well for the consultant's ability to
catalyze the hoped-for meaningful dialogue within the Ministry.36 By 2007, the tribunal
found that the Ministry had not been implementing the tribunal's previous orders in good
faith,37 and in February 2011 the tribunal found that a prima facie case had been made
out that the Deputy Minister was in contempt for failing to implement the earlier orders.
The tribunal exercised its discretion to state a case for contempt to the Ontario Divisional
Court.38 (As we see below, this is a tribunal’s last resort in trying to get its orders
followed.)
Before that case could be heard, however, and after 23 years of litigation, Michael
McKinnon and the Ministry finally reached a settlement. Under the August 2011
settlement agreement, the OHRC, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional
Services, and the Ministry of Government Services all signed on to a three-year Human
Rights Project, which established mechanisms targeting accountability, operations,
learning, and complaint management within Correctional Services.39 Despite progress,
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however, a pervasive “organizational culture” remained a barrier to effecting “long-term,
systemic, or broad-based human rights improvements.”40 In the agreement’s final year,
the parties formulated a “Multi-Year Plan” to “crystalize the extensive work” done to
date and to “sustain change” into the future.41
The McKinnon settlement and the efforts that continue to follow it are cause for some
optimism, but a satisfactory result was never, and is still not, a foregone conclusion. The
2011 settlement might not have happened in the absence of a factor external to the
tribunal process—the appointment of a new Deputy Minister of Corrections with a
mandate to professionalize the service and improve its record.42 Nor is a 23-year-long
litigation matter ever really a victory, no matter what its outcome. Thus, McKinnon raised
and still leaves us with some challenging questions: is it possible to effect real,
substantive "good faith" compliance in a truly recalcitrant employer? Is it appropriate to
use law to simultaneously enforce rights, redress wrongs, and "cure" systemic problems?
Is it appropriate for a tribunal to continue crafting new orders in an effort to achieve an
optimal outcome? Can external third parties really change culture and create meaningful
dialogue? If not, what legal options do we have left—through tribunal remedies or
otherwise?
Moreover, we should not overestimate courts’ comfort with broader remedial orders
by tribunals that aim to address systemic problems. Court review of tribunal remedies by
means of judicial review serves a valuable validation function, based on important ruleof-law values. It also introduces some difficult tensions. As we have identified, cases like
[lt]http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/annual-report-2011-2012-human-rights-nextgeneration/correctional-services-update-mcscs-human-rights-project-charter[gt].
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McKinnon straddle what Chayes might describe as the boundary between party-on-party
dispute resolution and public law litigation. As we know, when courts engage with
systemic issues they run quickly into public policy choices, public law separation of
powers concerns, and legitimacy concerns. Tribunals, too, may quickly run into the limits
of their statutory authority. This is as it should be. And yet, for these reasons, judicial
review may always serve as a brake on tribunals’ more ambitious efforts to effect
systemic change.
For example, in Moore v British Columbia (Education),43 the court reviewed the BC
Human Rights Tribunal’s decision that the failure to provide educational support to
Jeffrey Moore, a child with dyslexia, constituted discrimination on the basis of disability.
The tribunal had considered not only Jeffrey’s personal damages but also the fact that the
BC Ministry of Education had implemented a fixed cap on special education funding,
below the actual incidence rate; and the school district’s decision, faced with those
funding constraints, to close its Diagnostic Centre, which provided support to dyslexic
students, without providing an adequate substitute.
At the Supreme Court of Canada, writing for a unanimous court, Abella J upheld the
Human Rights Tribunal’s findings of discrimination against Jeffrey by the District, and
the personal damages it awarded. However, the tribunal’s systemic remedies were held to
be too remote from the scope of the complaint.44 They were “quashed,” or invalidated.
The court observed that a remedy afforded by the tribunal to an individual claimant could
still have a systemic impact, but that
The remedy must flow from the claim. In this case, the claim was made
on behalf of Jeffrey, and the evidence giving concrete support to the claim all
centred on him. While the Tribunal was certainly entitled to consider systemic
evidence in order to determine whether Jeffrey had suffered discrimination, it was
unnecessary for it to hold an extensive inquiry into the precise format of the
provincial funding mechanism or the entire provincial administration of special
education in order to determine whether Jeffrey was discriminated against. The
Tribunal, with great respect, is an adjudicator of the particular claim that is
before it, not a Royal Commission.45
Abella J also set aside the tribunal’s remedial orders against the Ministry on the
basis that the connection between province-wide fixed cap funding and closure of the
Diagnostic Centre was too remote. Moreover, Abella J found no need for the tribunal to
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remain seized “on behalf of an individual student who has finished his high school
education and will not re-enter the public school system.”46 The sharp contrast in Moore
between the tribunal’s conception of its mandate, consistent with the Chayes public law
litigation model, and the Supreme Court’s retrospective, party-focused analysis
underscores both the possibilities, and limitations, of novel remedial strategies in
effecting systemic change.
III.

Enforcing Tribunal Orders Against Parties

After a tribunal makes a decision and imposes an order, assuming no one challenges
that decision,47 another set of administrative law remedies becomes available: the
enforcement powers. These may be invoked where a tribunal needs to enforce its order
against a party that is not complying with the order. This is not uncommon among selfregulatory organizations such as professional licensing bodies, where the tribunal acts
against particular individuals rather than adjudicating disputes between parties.
Alternatively, a party to a multiparty dispute before a tribunal may want to enforce the
tribunal's order against another party on which the order was imposed. Criminal
prosecution is also a possibility. Of course, regardless of any broader social patterns or
systemic factors operating, tribunal orders can only be enforced against the parties on
which they are imposed.
A. The Tribunal Seeks to Enforce Its Order
Rarely, a tribunal may enforce its own orders. One tribunal that has the power to
enforce its own orders—for example, an order for civil contempt—is the federal
Competition Tribunal.48 Some other tribunals are also given the authority to enforce
monetary obligations, such as requiring unpaid wages or family maintenance to be paid,
imposing liens, making garnishment orders, seizing assets, or even suspending driving
privileges.49 However, any enforcement powers a tribunal has must be granted to the
tribunal in its enabling statute, and that delegation of enforcement power must pass
46
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constitutional scrutiny. For example, a provincially created tribunal cannot have criminal
(and therefore federal) enforcement powers.50
In British Columbia, certain sections of the ATA51 are intended to assist tribunals in
obtaining compliance with their orders. For example, s 18 permits certain tribunals to
schedule a hearing, make a decision, or dismiss an application if a party fails to comply
with an order (presumably, an order to appear). Section 31(1)(e) permits some tribunals
to dismiss an application if the applicant fails to comply with a tribunal order. Section 47,
which permits some tribunals to make orders for payment of costs, also allows some
tribunals, under s 47(1)(c), to require a party to pay the tribunal's actual costs "if the
tribunal considers the conduct of a party has been improper, vexatious, frivolous or
abusive." Orders for costs, on being filed in the court registry, have the same effect as a
court order for the recovery of a debt (s 47(2)).
More commonly, the tribunal must make an application in court to enforce any order
it makes. Where a party has disobeyed a tribunal order, the statute provides that the
tribunal may apply to court for an order requiring the person to comply.52 The tribunal's
order is presumed to be valid and correct if the party disobeying it failed to file an appeal
(if one is available) or if the party appealed and lost.53 Other statutes allow tribunal orders
to be registered with the court, sometimes only with leave.54 In Quebec, a distinct
procedure known as homologation gives courts the authority to compel individuals to
fulfill tribunal orders. Courts can only access homologation if it is expressly provided for
in the tribunal's enabling statute.55 The omnibus Statutory Powers Procedure Act56 in
Ontario allows tribunals to state a case for contempt to the Ontario Divisional Court, as
happened in the McKinnon case in 2011.
Once a tribunal has successfully converted its order into a court order through one of
the mechanisms above, the order can be enforced in the same manner as a court
50
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judgment. Among other things, this means that the court can initiate contempt
proceedings if the party continues to disregard the order.57 Contempt proceedings may be
available if a party fails to abide by a tribunal's procedural order (for example, by failing
to appear as a witness or to produce documents) or a tribunal's final substantive order.58
Contempt can be civil or, where the conduct constitutes an intentional public act of
defiance of the court, criminal.59 In a contempt proceeding, the judge does not inquire
into the validity of the tribunal's underlying order. However, only violations of "clear and
unambiguous" tribunal orders will form the basis of a contempt order.60 A court can also
refuse to hold a party in contempt until an appeal or judicial review application
(discussed in Section IV below) is completed, although parties can be required to pay
moneys into court in the meantime.61
Note that legislators seem content to house tribunal order enforcement powers in the
courts, even while using clauses to try to limit the availability of judicial review from
administrative tribunals (known as “privative clauses”).62 For the legislative drafter, then,
access to courts to enforce tribunal orders seems to be acceptable, while access to courts
to challenge tribunal orders is less so. There is history at work here, along with separation
of powers concerns and the legislator's appreciation for courts' existing enforcement
powers. Arguably, this drafting choice also signals that legislators may be most
concerned about conserving scarce judicial resources when those judicial resources might
be deployed to undermine, rather than buttress and reinforce, the authority of the
tribunals the legislation creates.
B. A Party Seeks to Enforce a Tribunal's Order
57
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A party to an administrative action may also, exceptionally, bring an action against
another party in court to enforce the tribunal's order. For example, a group of teachers
successfully sought to enforce an arbitrator's order that a school board annually set aside
certain funds for teachers' professional development.63 Sara Blake has suggested that the
party's success "may depend on whether the tribunal order is of a type that a court would
enforce, and whether the court believes it should enforce the tribunal order in the absence
of any statutory procedure for obtaining court assistance."64 In other words, courts may
be more likely to grant a private application to enforce a tribunal order where the court
recognizes the tribunal's order as similar to the kind of order that a court might make.
However, the private applicant will first have the difficult task of convincing the court
that it should intervene in this way, even though there may be no statutory provision
explicitly empowering it to do so.
C. Criminal Prosecution
Many statutes provide for quasi-criminal prosecution of persons who disobey tribunal
orders. Quasi-criminal offences are prosecuted by the federal or provincial Crown, as
appropriate, and they carry penalties that include fines and imprisonment. For example, a
person who commits an offence under s 155 of the BC Securities Act65 is liable to a fine
of not more than $3 million, to imprisonment for not more than three years, or both.
Indictable offences under the federal Fisheries Act66 may attract, at their upper end, fines
of up to $500,000 or imprisonment for up two years, or both.67
In the absence of other provisions, it is a criminal offence to disobey a lawful order of
a federal or provincial tribunal. The federal Criminal Code states:
127(1). Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a
court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give
the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other
mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two
years; or
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(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.68
The Criminal Code provision is only available where no other penalty is expressly
provided by law. What does this mean? Superior courts' own contempt powers do not
generally count as an "other mode of proceeding" for purposes of this section.69 Most
administrative tribunals do not have the ability to make contempt orders on their own.
Therefore, the Criminal Code provisions should apply where no "punishment or other
mode of proceeding" is explicitly set out in the tribunal's enabling statute. This has been
held not to violate the constitutional separation of powers, even when dealing with
provincial tribunals, on the basis that the provincial tribunal is still making orders that are
non-criminal. Parliament, acting within its sphere, is the one that has decided that breach
of those provincial provisions is a criminal offence.70
IV.

Challenging Administrative Action Without Going to Court

A party to an administrative action may also decide to challenge that administrative
action itself. The possible bases for a party's challenge are described in other chapters in
this text. For example, a party may challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction, its procedure, its
impartiality, or the substance of its final decision. Each of these usually amounts to a
direct or indirect challenge to the remedies or orders the tribunal imposes. Sometimes,
these challenges are made through applications for what in administrative law is called
“judicial review.” However, applications for judicial review, like litigation generally, can
be expensive and drawn-out affairs. Moreover, it is important to be realistic about what
can be achieved through judicial review. In order to bring a successful judicial review
application, a challenger must be aware of the specific remedial mechanisms available
and how those mechanisms will help them achieve the result that they want. For example,
as the Gitxaala Nation example shows, a motion to quash a tribunal decision, if
successful, will usually only lead to the court sending the matter back to the original
tribunal for rehearing.71 This result may not satisfy the challenger. Even assuming that
proper procedure is observed the second time, there is no guarantee that the party will
receive the substantive outcome they seek.
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For these reasons, parties seeking to challenge administrative action should consider
their options carefully. This part of the chapter outlines the various review mechanisms
available, including both non-court mechanisms and court-based mechanisms. We begin
first with mechanisms that are internal to the administrative apparatus itself, then move to
mechanisms that exist externally to both the administrative agency and courts (for
example, ombudspersons), finally turning to court-based mechanisms. Here we
distinguish between appeals and judicial review, and discuss private law or alternative
monetary remedies that may exist against administrative decision-makers.
A. Internal Tribunal Mechanisms
A party considering a challenge to tribunal action will need to understand the
particular tribunal's structure and capacity, as established by its enabling statute. All
tribunals can fix certain things, such as clerical errors or factual errors due to mistake or
dishonesty, without express statutory authority. This is sometimes called the "slip rule."72
Tribunals can also "change their minds" until the time a final decision is made. Therefore,
what constitutes a "final decision" is important. For example, if a statute provides that
final decisions must be in writing, then only written decisions will constitute final
decisions. Preliminary rulings can also be changed until the final decision on a matter has
been made.73
Some enabling statutes specifically provide tribunals with the ability to reconsider
and rehear decisions they have made. This is most common where a particular tribunal
has ongoing regulatory responsibility over a particular domain, such as public utilities
regulation or employer–employee relations. For example, the Public Service Labour
Relations Act provides, "[s]ubject to subsection (2) [prohibiting retroactive effect of any
rights acquired], the Board may review, rescind or amend any of its orders or decisions,
or may rehear any application before making an order in respect of the application."74
Absent such express statutory authority, however, for policy reasons that favour finality
of proceedings, a tribunal cannot reconsider or alter a final decision made within its
jurisdiction. Once it has made a final decision, the tribunal is functus officio.75
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Chandler, supra note 71. Because rights of appeal from tribunals tend to be more
limited than from courts, the functus officio doctrine should be more flexible and less
formulistic for such tribunals.

As a next-best alternative for challenging a tribunal decision, consider that some
administrative tribunals are part of multi-tiered administrative agencies. Those tribunals'
enabling statutes may provide for appeals internal to the administrative agency itself. For
example, parties appearing before Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board Immigration
Division may appeal to its Immigration Appeal Division.76 Similarly, provincial
securities acts across the country provide that persons directly affected by decisions made
by Securities Commission staff may appeal to (or, in some statutes, seek "review" from)
the commission itself, to which staff report.77 Again, parties should be aware that internal
appellate structures may not look much like courts.
These internal review proceedings do not preclude subsequent appeals to the courts.
Indeed, the various provincial securities acts mentioned above provide for appeals under
limited conditions from their internal appellate bodies to the courts. These are called
"statutory appeals." Where the statute does not provide for an appeal to the courts, the
parties' only access to the courts is by means of judicial review. However, as discussed in
more detail below, where a statute provides for reconsideration or internal administrative
appeals within a multi-tiered agency, a challenger will generally be expected to exhaust
those avenues before making an application for judicial review.
One of the more interesting innovations in internal administrative appeals was created
in 1996, with the passage of Quebec's Administrative Justice Act.78 The statute creates the
Tribunal administratif du Québec (TAQ), a supertribunal that hears "proceedings"
brought against almost all administrative tribunals and public bodies in the province,
including government departments, boards, commissions, municipalities, and health-care
bodies.79 As a practical matter, this means that there is now one main appellate/review
body for administrative matters in the province. According to the Act, the tribunal's
purpose is "to affirm the specific character of administrative justice, to ensure its quality,
promptness and accessibility and to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens."80 It is
an administrative (that is, executive branch) institution, not a judicial one, but its remedial
powers include judicial review-style options and (surprisingly for common law
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administrative lawyers) the ability to substitute its decision for an original tribunal's: "[i]n
the case of the contestation of a decision, the Tribunal may confirm, vary or quash the
contested decision and, if appropriate, make the decision which, in its opinion, should
have been made initially."81 Where the TAQ has jurisdiction to consider a proceeding,
claimants should exhaust the remedies available from it rather than trying to circumvent
the administrative process.82 Avenues of appeal from the TAQ to the Superior Court of
Quebec are limited.83
B. External Non-Court Mechanisms
A party considering a challenge to administrative action should also not overlook
non-legal avenues. For example, ombudspersons or similar positions exist by statute in
every Canadian province. There is no overarching federal ombudsperson, but some
federal departments and subject areas have their own specialized ombudspersons.
Generally, the mandate of an ombudsperson is to provide a forum for citizens to bring
their complaints regarding the way that government departments and agencies have dealt
with them. There is no charge to make a complaint to an ombudsperson. Ombudspersons
have discretion as to whether or not they will investigate a complaint.
An ongoing issue has been the degree to which an ombudsperson can assert
jurisdiction with respect to administrative tribunal decisions and processes (as opposed to
the general run of government departments and ministries—that is, public servants not
possessing the statutorily created decision-making structure that tribunals have). Most
legislation defines the ombudsperson's jurisdiction as being over "matters of
administration," and courts have tended to define "administration" expansively as
involving generic administrative processes, not simply as the antonym of "judicial"
processes.84 Among the tribunals themselves, the range of bodies subject to an
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ombudsperson's investigatory powers can be quite broad. In Ontario, for example, the
courts have held that even largely independent bodies can be subject to ombuds review if
the government pays its members' wages.85 However, most ombuds statutes provide that
an ombudsperson is not authorized to investigate a tribunal's decision until after any right
of appeal or review on the merits has been exercised or until after the time limit for doing
so has expired.86
Several other public officials similar to ombudspersons also exist, including freedom
of information and privacy commissioners, the auditor general, provincial auditors, and
human rights commissioners. While harder for individuals to instigate, public inquiries
are another mechanism for challenging government conduct.87
C. Using the Courts
Finally, there are the courts. The ability to challenge administrative action in the
courts is a mixed, but necessary, blessing. On the downside, even leaving aside some
very serious concerns about costs and access to justice, courts may be reluctant to
embrace novel, non-courtlike, yet potentially effective remedies devised by specialized
tribunals. The richness and creativity that may characterize administrative law remedies
could be stifled by potentially over-judicialized, overly interventionist court scrutiny.
This is one reason that the internal appeal mechanisms described above, which permit
decisions to be reviewed by higher-level bodies within the administrative agency
structure itself, make sense. On the other hand, there are times—among others, during
national emergencies—when executive action unquestionably needs to be subject to the
rule of law, as applied by independent courts.88 As with so many things in administrative
jurisdiction over "administration of a government agency" to include investigations into
matters determined by administrative tribunals: Ombudsman of Ontario v Ontario
(Labour Relations Board) (1986), 44 DLR (4th) 312 (Ont CA).
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law, context matters in thinking about the legitimacy of each alternative. There may be
times when it makes sense to maintain the integrity of the administrative regime through
all internal appeal stages. There may also be times when what is required is faster and
unapologetic recourse to the courts—for example, allowing a party to "leapfrog" the
internal appeals and proceed directly to judicial review.
There are two main ways by which a party to a tribunal action can access the courts to
challenge that action: appeal and judicial review. Appeal mechanisms—either to internal
administrative appellate bodies or to courts—are provided for in the statutory scheme
itself. The scope of a possible appeal is confined to what the statute expressly provides.
Courts still struggle sometimes with knotty issues in taking appeals from administrative
tribunals, but relative to judicial review it is easier to determine whether internal appeals
or statutory appeals to the courts are available: one just has to read the statute. By
contrast, judicial review is an exceptional remedy that goes beyond what the statute
provides for.89 Significantly, judicial review is also discretionary. Judicial review
doctrine is the product of decades of contentious court battles, modified from time to time
by statute, directly pitting "legal" values of justice and the rule of law against
"democratic" values and legislative intent, as well as "bureaucratic" values such as
efficiency and expertise. Even the seemingly basic questions of whether judicial review is
available in a particular situation, and what remedies are available, have been shaped by
these contests.
Regardless of whether a party exercises a statutory right of appeal, where available,
or seeks judicial review, that court decision can be appealed further up the judicial
hierarchy.90
1. Statutory Rights of Appeal to the Courts
Below are the major questions a party must ask to determine whether an appeal from
a tribunal to the courts is available to them.
a. Does the Tribunal's Enabling Statute Provide for a Right of Appeal?

treated differently: consider Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1
SCR 44 [Khadr].
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When reviewing a statutory appeal from an administrative actor or a judicial review, an
appellate court should “step into the shoes” of the court that initially conducted the
judicial review, determining whether the judge selected the appropriate standard of
review and applied it correctly: Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 SCR 559 at paras 46-47.

Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over administrative tribunals.91 A
tribunal's enabling statute may provide for a right to appeal to the courts. If it does not,
then quite simply there is no such appeal. A dissatisfied party could only access the
courts by way of the exceptional remedy of judicial review, described below. Moreover,
parties generally may not appeal interlocutory rulings (for example, on jurisdiction,
procedural or evidentiary issues, or bias).92 To be appealable, the tribunal's decision must
decide the merits of the matter or otherwise be a final disposition of it.93
Usually, a tribunal's enabling statute will also set out the court to which tribunal
orders may be appealed. For federal tribunals, appeals are usually taken to the Federal
Court or the Federal Court of Appeal.94 Appeals from provincially constituted tribunals
may be taken, depending on what the enabling statute says, to the province's trial court of
general jurisdiction,95 to a divisional court,96 or to a court of appeal.97 Rarely, a statute
will provide a right (seldom exercised) to appeal a tribunal decision to Cabinet itself.98
b. What Is the Scope of Available Appeal?
Just as the enabling statute determines whether a statutory appeal is available in the
first place, the enabling statute entirely determines its scope. That scope varies from
tribunal to tribunal. Some statutes permit complete de novo review of a tribunal's
decision, while others will be limited to issues of law based entirely on the record. In
other words, an appellate court's jurisdiction in reviewing tribunal decisions may be
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different in scope from an appellate court's jurisdiction in reviewing lower court
decisions. A court that has been designated to take appeals from a tribunal's decision
must look to the tribunal's enabling statute to determine the breadth and scope of its
appellate powers. Often, for example, enabling statutes will provide for a statutory right
of appeal from an administrative decision-maker only on questions of law or
jurisdiction.99
Arguably, the scope of an available appeal is determined by how closely the tribunal's
subject matter, and its expertise, mirror the mandate and expertise of general courts.
Statutes are more likely to provide a right of appeal to the courts where the tribunal has
the power to affect individual rights (for example, human rights tribunals, land-use
planning tribunals, and professional licensing). Labour relations and employment-related
matters, which have long been adjudicated by tripartite boards with specialized expertise
and which involve claims by organized labour to which courts were historically perceived
to be hostile, cannot generally be appealed to the courts.100 The same considerations
affect the scope of available appeal. A statute is more likely to provide for a right of
appeal to the courts where individual rights are at stake. For example, statutes generally
provide for a broad power to appeal from certain professional disciplinary tribunals on
questions of fact and law, where professionals risk losing their ability to practice their

99

In Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47,
[2016] 2 SCR 293 at para 29, the majority pointed to six recent Supreme Court of Canada
decisions involving statutory rights of appeal. In five of those cases, as well as in the
Edmonton East context itself, the statutes in question provided for leave to appeal to the
relevant court only on questions of law or of jurisdiction. In one case, Sattva Capital
Corp v Creston Moly Corp, 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 SCR 633, a statutory appeal was
available on a question of law, with leave and subject to potential conditions, effectively
where the court had determined that the point of law was of particular importance to the
parties, to a group of individuals, or to the public generally: Arbitration Act, RSBC 1996,
c 55, s 31(2). It is not surprising that arbitrators would be treated differently than
tribunals in this regard.
100

Gus Van Harten et al, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials, 7th ed
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2015) at 17. While Canadian courts were historically not
friendly to organized labour, they were not as hostile to it as US courts were: John
Godard, “Labour Law and Union Recognition in Canada: A Historical-Institutionalist
Perspective,” (2013) 38:2 Queen’s LJ 391-418 at 400.

profession,101 and from human rights tribunals adjudicating on violations of human rights
codes.102
Yet even where the appeal rights are broad, courts will show deference to a tribunal’s
decisions, in order to respect the legislative intention to give a specialized tribunal
responsibility for a particular statutory regime, and because of the tribunal’s expertise and
its familiarity with its own legislative scheme. Note that the standard of review on a
statutory appeal from an administrative decision is generally “reasonableness.” That is,
unlike an appeal from a trial court to an appellate court, the question is not whether the
original decision-maker made an error of law, or committed a palpable and overriding
error of fact.103 Most of the time, the question on a statutory appeal from an
administrative decision-maker, as it is on judicial review, is not whether the decisionmaker’s decision was correct, but whether it was reasonable.104 Standard of review is
discussed in detail in Chapters 11 and 12 of this text.
Below are a few more considerations relevant to statutory appeals from
administrative tribunals.
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Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 SCR 3 at
paras 38, 46 (“Where a court reviews a decision of a specialized administrative tribunal,
the standard of review must be determined on the basis of administrative law principles
… regardless of whether the review is conducted in the context of an application for
judicial review or of a statutory appeal,” and “on judicial review of a decision of a
specialized administrative tribunal interpreting and applying its enabling statute, it should
be presumed that the standard of review is reasonableness”); also Edmonton East, supra
note 99 at paras 22-31. In Edmonton East, the Court split 5:4, with a forceful dissent, on
the question of whether the standard of review was necessarily reasonableness, when the
statutory regime provided for a right of appeal from the administrative decision-maker to
the courts. However, all judges apparently agreed that statutory appeals from
administrative decision-makers should be conducted on the basis of administrative law
principles.

c. Is an Appeal Available as of Right, or Is Leave Required? If Leave Is Required,
Who May Grant It?
Appeals can be as of right or require leave. Where leave must be obtained, it can be
the leave either of the original decision-maker or, more frequently, of the appellate body
(that is, the court). For example, British Columbia's Forest Practices Code105 provides for
an appeal as of right from the Forest Appeals Commission to the BC Supreme Court on
questions of law or jurisdiction. By contrast, a person affected by a decision of the BC
Securities Commission may appeal to the BC Court of Appeal only with leave of a justice
of that court.106 Sometimes, additional statutory criteria must also be met before such
leave will be granted.107
d. Is a Stay of Proceedings Automatic, or Must One Apply for It?
The rules governing stays of proceedings vary between jurisdictions and even
tribunals. Specific enabling statutes may expressly empower their tribunals or the
appellate bodies (internal or court) to which they appeal to stay enforcement of the
tribunal order pending appeal.108 The Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act109
establishes a default rule that an appeal operates as a stay of a tribunal's proceedings.110
The BC ATA, by contrast, provides that "the commencement of an appeal does not
operate as a stay or suspend the operation of the decision being appealed unless the
tribunal orders otherwise."111 In the Federal Court, as well, stays of proceedings are
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usually discretionary.112 Unless a statute specifically excludes it, as BC's ATA does, the
superior court that is the tribunal's designated appellate court has the inherent authority to
grant a stay.113
Like the legislative decision to permit appeals as of right or only with leave, a
legislative decision to make a stay automatic or not says something about how the
legislature views the tribunals in question. Requiring potential appellants to apply for
leave to appeal places an additional hurdle before them. Automatically staying a
tribunal's decision holds its powers in abeyance while a court checks the tribunal's
decision. Where the legislature decides that stays will not be automatic, the legislature
may choose to allocate the power to order a stay either to the tribunal or to a court. These
statutory drafting decisions reflect the legislature's assessment of the proper balancing of
rule-of-law and efficiency concerns, the balance between tribunal expertise and judicial
oversight, and the legislature's comfort with granting broad autonomy to the relevant
tribunal.
D. Using the Courts: Judicial Review
Now, finally, we discuss judicial review, the parallel universe under whose rules the
outcome in Gitxaala Nation could be considered some sort of victory for the Gitxaala.
Judicial review has long been the fixation of administrative law, at the expense of
tribunal-based and extralegal mechanisms and statutory appeals—not to mention the
hugely important arena of administrative rulemaking—in part because administrative law
is created primarily by judges, lawyers, and legal scholars. The legal training these
individuals receive is, understandably, preoccupied with legal mechanisms and, in
particular, with courts and the common law. This makes for an overly narrow lens. And
yet, having placed judicial review in its broader context, it nonetheless deserves careful
attention. Judicial review can be conceptually and logistically complex, and it differs
from a straightforward appeal. The outcome in Gitxaala Nation was a function of the
available judicial review remedies.
As we shall see throughout this volume, the basic nature of judicial review is different
from statutory or internal tribunal appeals because, at its root, judicial review is about the
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inherent jurisdiction of courts to oversee and check administrative (that is, executive)
action in the interest of the rule of law. This makes it a potentially sweeping remedy.
Unlike appeals from tribunals, which are statutorily created, judicial review is the review
of executive action beyond what the legislature provided for.
Here are four things to know about judicial review: first, courts always and
fundamentally retain the discretion to hear, or not to hear, an application for judicial
review. Second, in addition to overcoming the fundamentally discretionary nature of
judicial review, an applicant will need to cross some specific thresholds in order to be
heard. Third, the historical development of the remedies available through judicial review
has actively shaped, and limited, the possibilities and potential of judicial review itself. In
spite of statutory reform and evolving case law, the ancient prerogative writs that were
the original forms of judicial review continue to haunt its present forms. And finally, in
response to the apparent disconnect between what some parties may want by way of
remedies and what they can obtain on judicial review, some interesting private law and
monetary damages-oriented remedies have sprung up around the edges of judicial review.
Each of these points is developed in more detail below.
1. Discretionary Bases for Refusing a Remedy
A court's decision whether to grant judicial review is intimately bound up with the
core tension that underlies all of administrative law—what the Supreme Court has called
"an underlying tension between the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle,
which finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create
various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers."114 Courts are the
indispensable guardians of the rule of law, but they still need to operate within their
sphere of authority. This means respecting the fact that, through enabling statutes,
legislatures grant authority over certain things to administrative tribunals, and not to the
courts. A lot of administrative law jurisprudence is devoted to trying to negotiate a path
through the difficult territory on the borders of the branches' spheres of authority. What
concerns us here is the threshold question of whether to grant judicial review at all—
before considering the merits of the case, before figuring out the standard of review, and
before determining the degree of procedural fairness a party is entitled to. Judicial review
is fundamentally discretionary in a way that appeals are not. A court has the discretion to
refuse to grant a remedy even where one seems clearly warranted on the facts.115
The original set of discretionary grounds for refusing relief derive from common
law and equity, and they have survived the statutory reform of judicial review. They are
reminiscent of similar equity-based grounds in civil procedure, such as laches
(unreasonable delay), or unconscionability:
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1.
The most important basis for refusing to grant a remedy in judicial review
is discussed in more detail below: that adequate alternative remedies are available.116
Parties should exhaust all other legal avenues for review before proceeding to the "last
resort" of judicial review.
2.
Judicial review applications that are brought before tribunal proceedings
have been concluded are usually dismissed as being premature. This includes challenges
to the tribunal's interim procedural and evidentiary rulings. The policy rationales that
underlie dismissals for prematurity include: (a) that administrative action is meant to be
more cost-effective than court proceedings, and interim judicial review fragments and
protracts those proceedings; (b) that preliminary complaints may become moot as the
proceedings progress; and (c) that the court will be in a better position to assess the
situation once a full and complete record of tribunal proceedings exists. 117 A judge on
judicial review retains the discretion to hear an early application; there is no “hard and
fast rule” that prevents reviewing interim decisions.118 However, to obtain judicial review
of a tribunal's preliminary or interim ruling, an applicant must generally show exceptional
circumstances, the presence of which mean the applicant should not be forced to wait
until the administrative proceeding concludes. This is particularly true where the
evidentiary record is not complete, factual issues have not been resolved, or the tribunal’s
expertise has not yet been brought to bear on relevant issues. 119 Evidence of irreparable
harm, prejudice, costs, or delay, or the absence of an appropriate remedy at the end of the
proceedings may constitute special or exceptional circumstances. 120 Concerns that do not
qualify include those about procedural fairness or bias, jurisdictional issues, the presence of
an important legal or constitutional issue, or the fact that all parties have consented to
seeking judicial review early.121
3.
Even if statutory time limits for filing a judicial review application have
been met, parties must be aware that delay and acquiescence may be grounds for a
116
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reviewing court to refuse a remedy.122 Parties should object promptly to any perceived
impropriety on the part of the tribunal. Similarly, choosing not to attend a hearing could
waive any right to judicial review.
4.
A remedy in judicial review will not be granted where the issues are moot.
This may be the case where a dispute is over or has not yet arisen, where a tribunal's
order has expired or no longer affects the applicant, or where the litigant no longer
actually wants the remedy that the tribunal might have granted had it not erred.123
5.
The court will use its discretion to refuse to grant a remedy on judicial
review where the party making the judicial review application does not come with clean
hands. This could include seeking a remedy to facilitate illegal conduct or to obtain an
unfair advantage, or flouting the law or making misrepresentations. 124
By the 1990s, these long-standing grounds for refusing relief came to be overlaid
with a different vision of judicial review that reflected a new sensitivity to separation of
powers issues, and increased deference toward administrative tribunals. The overarching
presumption of judicial deference toward administrative decision-making percolated
throughout the judicial review process, eventually reaching the discretionary grounds for
granting relief in the first place. In other words, even where the five original grounds
above were not present, courts began to recognize that it could sometimes be appropriate
to refuse to grant judicial review out of deference to tribunals' unique institutional roles.
Perhaps the most forceful statement about the contingent nature of judicial review
remedies from this era comes from Domtar Inc. v Quebec.125 In deciding not to intervene
to resolve a conflict in legal interpretation between two tribunals construing the same
statutory language, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, "[t]he advisability of judicial
intervention in the event of conflicting decisions among administrative tribunals, even
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when serious and unquestionable, cannot, in these circumstances, be determined solely by
the 'triumph' of the rule of law."126 The court went on to articulate what was then a novel,
and striking, notion: that even the most deeply cherished rule-of-law values will not
always point the way to the only, or perhaps even the most appropriate, response to a
problem in administrative law:
[C]ertainty of the law and decision-making consistency are chiefly notable for
their relativity. Like the rules of natural justice, these objectives cannot be absolute in
nature regardless of the context. The value represented by the decision-making
independence and autonomy of the members of administrative tribunals goes hand in
hand here with the principle that their decisions should be effective. In light of these
considerations we must conclude that, for purposes of judicial review, the principle of the
rule of law must be qualified. This is consistent with the continuing evolution of
administrative law itself.127
Consistent with this, in 1999, Chief Justice McLachlin set forth a vision of a "new
rule of law," which would
[make] it possible for institutions other than courts to play key roles in
maintaining it. It opens the door to the idea that courts do not necessarily have a
monopoly on the values of reasons and fairness … [C]ontrary to Dicey's view that the
courts' primary role is to constrain, limit and, if possible eliminate administrative power,
the new Rule of Law allows courts to respect and advance the roles of administrative
tribunals. The courts' role shifts from being a brute guardian of an artificial and restrictive
Rule of Law to that of a partner.128
In this way, courts moved past the restrictive traditional grounds for refusing to
exercise discretion to grant judicial review. They did so in the service of a more
respectful relationship with the other branches of government, and particularly with
administrative tribunals. But to the extent that this shift could be read as introducing
some poorly-defined, deferential "X factor" into the decision-making process, it risked
exempting courts from the very ethos of justification that tribunals were expected to
observe in their decision-making. Surely this would be a misreading. The fact that
judicial review is discretionary does not mean that courts should refuse to grant judicial
review solely on the basis of some abstract ideal of partnership with administrative
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tribunals, or a relative and qualified rule-of-law value. Respecting, protecting, and
adhering to the rule of law means that judges should base even their discretionary
decisions on identifiable reasons.
Today, in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant judicial review, a
court adopts a multi-factorial, contextual approach that nevertheless draws some insight
from the traditional grounds described above. Deference to tribunals at the point of
deciding whether to grant judicial review is understood to be consistent with normal
judicial review analysis, which generally aims to strike the balance between the courts'
essential role in upholding the rule of law, while avoiding "undue interference" with
administrative powers.129 While the factors to be considered in exercising the discretion
“cannot be reduced to a checklist or a statement of general rules,”130 there is guidance to
be had. In Khosa, the court stated that the discretion to grant or withhold judicial review
“must be exercised judicially and in accordance with proper principles."131 In setting out
those proper principles, the court identified the standard of review principles that govern
administrative law generally, and which are discussed in other chapters of this book, plus
the traditional grounds as identified and described above: “other factors such as an
applicant's delay, failure to exhaust adequate alternate remedies, mootness, prematurity,
bad faith and so forth.”132 In MiningWatch (per coram with Rothstein J writing), the court
added another consideration. It is one that has been rising in salience since Khosa: the
balance of convenience to the various parties.133 In an interesting juxtaposition to the
Domtar language, which had proposed that the rule of law must sometimes be qualified,
MiningWatch observes that, because the discretionary power to refuse judicial review
“may make inroads upon the rule of law, it must be exercised with the greatest care.”134 \

2. Is Judicial Review Available? Threshold Questions
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Leaving to one side what the cases above have said about the discretionary nature of
judicial review writ large, the unique history, purpose, and mechanics of judicial review
also mean that whether it will be available in any particular situation depends on a set of
considerations particular to administrative law.135
One of the key threshold questions is whether the tribunal whose actions are being
challenged is, in fact, a public body. Judicial review is available to check executive
action. Therefore, only public bodies can be subject to judicial review.136 While this may
sound straightforward, some organizations in Canadian society operate at considerable
remove from government, yet exercise some degree of "public" function. Others seem
private, but have some connection to public authority. For example, stock exchanges
regulate the conduct of their members and issue and revoke licences, and their operations
clearly go to the protection of the public. However, their authority to act as they do
derives from a compact with their members rather than from any statutory grant of
authority. Similarly, one should distinguish between government-acting-as-the-state, and
government-acting-as-private-contracting-party. As a general matter, a private party will
have difficulty seeking judicial review of a government board's decision not to award it a
particular contract.137 As well, public employees with employment contracts will have
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law remedies of declaration and injunction; however, these remedies are outside the
scope of this chapter.
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But consider the improper purpose doctrine: Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver
(City), [1994] 1 SCR 231.

their employment relationships governed by private (contract) law, not public
(administrative) law.138
Various factors go into determining whether a particular tribunal is a private body or
a public one. Relevant considerations include whether the matter at issue is of a more
public or more private character; the nature of the decision-maker and the nature of its
relationships to a statutory scheme or to government action; whether the decision being
challenged was authorized by a public source of law; and whether public law remedies
would be “suitable.”139
In addition to determining whether a tribunal is a sufficiently “public” body, a party
seeking to challenge administrative action should determine whether they have standing
to challenge a tribunal decision. The answer will be straightforward for individuals who
are actual parties to an administrative action, but other persons may have a collateral
interest in the same matter and may want to challenge a tribunal order that does not
directly affect them.140 There is also discretionary “public interest standing,” under which
an individual or group may be able to challenge administrative action on behalf of
others.141 Given that tribunals are expected to maintain a degree of impartiality, courts
will also exercise their discretion in deciding whether and to what degree a tribunal
should be able to participate when a party challenges its administrative action.142 Lorne
Sossin discusses standing in greater detail in Chapter XX.
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Dunsmuir, supra note 11411 especially at paras 79-83, 112-17.
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Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347 at para 60; see also McDonald v
Anishinabek Police Service (2006), 83 OR (3d) 132 (Div Ct) (decisions by the chief of a
police service created through a combination of contract and statute could be judicially
reviewed); Attawapiskat First Nation, supra note 121 at paras 50-62; Setia v Appleby
College, 2013 ONCA 753 (a private high school’s decision to expel a student could not
be judicially reviewed); West Toronto United Football Club v Ontario Soccer
Association, 2014 ONSC 5881 (a provincial soccer association’s decision to intervene in
a disputed match decision was judicially reviewable).
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See e.g. Globalive Wireless Management Corp v Public Mobile Inc, 2011 FCA 194.

141

The leading case is Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers
United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, para 37, under which the test is: “(1)
whether there is a serious justiciable issue raised; (2) whether the plaintiff has a real stake
or a genuine interest in it; and (3) whether, in all the circumstances, the proposed suit is a
reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.”
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Considerations include whether there is any other party with the necessary knowledge
and expertise to stand in opposition to the party challenging the administrative action;
whether the tribunal has a more policy-oriented or adjudicatory, dispute resolution
oriented role; and what limits need to be imposed to ensure that the tribunal is not

Third, a party seeking to challenge administrative action should determine to which
court they should apply for judicial review. Both the provincial superior courts and the
federal courts have judicial review jurisdiction. Although a tribunal's enabling statute will
generally set out which court has jurisdiction to hear a statutory appeal to the courts, this
is not the case for judicial review. (This makes sense, because judicial review is an
extraordinary remedy that the enabling statute does not provide for in the first place.)
Typically, the choice of courts is determined by whether the source of the impugned
authority's power is provincial or federal.143 Some overarching provincial statutes, such
as Ontario's Judicial Review Procedure Act, stipulate the particular provincial court to
which judicial review applications should be brought.144
Fourth, a party should ensure that they have not missed any deadlines. Some statutes
impose time limits within which a party must file an application for judicial review. For
example, the Federal Courts Act states that a judicial review application from a federal
tribunal to the Federal Court must be made within 30 days of the time the underlying
decision or order is first communicated.145 In Alberta, the rules impose a six-month time

“bootstrapping” a weak decision by, e.g. introducing new arguments after the fact:
Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc, 2015 SCC 414, [2015] 3 SCR
147, paras 52-59, 63-69.
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There are some exceptions. Provincial superior courts have concurrent or exclusive
jurisdiction over some specific aspects of federal statutory regimes, as a result of both the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, and
the Federal Courts Act, supra note 109. In particular, provincial superior courts have
concurrent jurisdiction where Charter issues are raised in attacks on federal legislative
regimes (Reza v Canada, [1994] 2 SCR 394) and—although this is private law, not
judicial review—over damages actions in which relief is sought against the federal
Crown (Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc, 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 SCR 585
[TeleZone]). On the Crown prerogative see also Hupacasath, supra note 13534, and on
concurrent jurisdiction more generally, see also Strickland, supra note 1152 at paras 1633 (affirming the Federal Court’s refusal to hear a judicial review of family law child
support guidelines on the basis that the provincial superior courts were the more
appropriate forum).
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Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA), RSO 1990, c J 1, s 6 says that judicial
review applications shall be made to the Divisional Court, unless “the case is one of
urgency and … the delay required for an application to the Divisional Court is likely to
involve a failure of justice,” in which case an application may be made to the Superior
Court of Justice.
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Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18.1(2). The deadline can be extended: see, e.g.
Canada (Attorney General) v Larkman, 2012 FCA 204.

limit on all applications for judicial review, except habeas corpus applications. 146 Nova
Scotia precludes all applications for judicial review after the earlier of six months
following the decision, or 25 days after the decision is communicated to the person.147 In
British Columbia, the general time limit is 60 days.148 Parties should therefore check all
applicable statutes, including the tribunal's enabling statutes, global procedural and
judicial review acts, and rules of court, for time limits affecting judicial review. However,
courts are often statutorily empowered to extend the time limit for making a judicial
review application—for example, where there is a reasonable explanation for the delay,
where no substantial prejudice or hardship would result from such an extension, or where
the party can demonstrate prima facie grounds for relief.149
The final threshold matter that a party must establish before gaining access to judicial
review is that they have exhausted all other adequate means of recourse for challenging
the tribunal's actions.150 Depending on the tribunal's enabling statute, other means of
recourse may include almost any of the legal remedies above: reconsideration by the
same tribunal, appeals to internal appellate tribunals and other intra-agency mechanisms
such as grievance arbitration, and appeals to a court. However, not all other means of
recourse will necessarily be adequate. Considerations include “the convenience of the
alternative remedy; the nature of the error alleged; the nature of the other forum which
could deal with the issue, including its remedial capacity; the existence of adequate and
effective recourse in the forum in which litigation is already taking place;
expeditiousness; the relative expertise of the alternative decision-maker; economical use
of judicial resources; and cost.”151 In balancing these factors, a court should engage in a
broad inquiry that considers not only whether some other remedy is adequate but
whether—taking into account the purposes and policy considerations underpinning the
legislative scheme, the balance of convenience to the parties, and other factors the court
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Rule 3.15 of the Alberta Rules of Court (Alta Reg 124/2010) imposes this time limit
where the relief sought is the setting aside of a decision or act.
147

Rule 7.05(1), Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, 2008, imposes the time limit on
applications for relief in the nature of certiorari, online:
[lt]http://www.courts.ns.ca/rules/cpr_consolidated_11_03_11/cpr_consolidated_rules_11
_03_11.pdf%5Bgt].
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BC ATA, supra note 15, s 57(1). Note, however, that the ATA does not apply to all
tribunals in BC
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E.g. Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act, supra note 125, s 5; BC ATA, supra note
15, s 57(2). The Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, does not set out the conditions that
must be met in order for the court to grant an extension of time: s 18.1(2).
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Harelkin v University of Regina, [1979] 2 SCR 561, 96 DLR (3d) 14.
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Strickland, supra note 11512 at para 42.

may consider relevant—granting judicial review in the circumstances would be
appropriate.152
Courts will not find existing non-court appeal mechanisms to be inadequate based
only on unproven allegations that an appellate tribunal will suffer from the same errors153
or biases154 as the original tribunal. Nor can challengers circumvent available appeals in
favour of judicial review by consent, or simply by raising apparent issues with the
original tribunal's procedure or jurisdiction.155 Also, at least in the context of Aboriginal
self-government in the taxation field, the fact that appellate tribunal members lack indicia
of institutional independence—that is, they may not be paid, they lack security of tenure,
and they are appointed by the people whose claims they have to adjudicate—will not
make that appellate body "inadequate" without concrete evidence that independence is
lacking in practice.156
Parliament and several provinces have also legislated in this area. For example,
the Federal Courts Act prohibits judicial review by the Federal Court where an available
appeal of a tribunal's decision to the Federal Court exists.157 Quebec's Code of Civil
Procedure also prohibits a superior court from applying Quebec's version of certiorari to
a tribunal decision where an appeal is available, unless the tribunal lacked or exceeded its
statutory authority. On the other hand, Ontario's Judicial Review Procedure Act and
Prince Edward Island's Judicial Review Act both permit judicial review notwithstanding
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Ibid at paras 43-44.
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Harelkin, supra note 149.
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Turnbull v Canadian Institute of Actuaries (1995), 129 DLR (4th) 42 (Man CA); but
see, contra, Re Batorski v Moody (1983), 42 OR (2d) 647 (Div Ct).
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Canada (Border Services Agency) v CB Powell Limited, supra note 119, at para 33
("Concerns about procedural fairness or bias, the presence of an important legal or
constitutional issue, or the fact that all parties have consented to early recourse to the
courts are not exceptional circumstances allowing parties to bypass an administrative
process, as long as that process allows the issues to be raised and an effective remedy to
be granted … [T]he presence of so-called jurisdictional issues is not an exceptional
circumstance justifying early recourse to courts.").
156
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Matsqui, supra note 152.

Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18.5. For a more extensive discussion of access
to judicial review in the Federal Court, see Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan
Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 FCA 250, [2014] 367 DLR (4th) 525.

any other right of appeal to the courts.158 Of course, the fact that a court may grant
judicial review, even where a right of appeal exists, does not mean that it will do so. As
we might expect, courts are reluctant to do so.159
E. Remedies on Judicial Review
The remedies available on judicial review have their roots in the ancient prerogative
writs, discussed further below. Over time, those became unwieldy. In many provinces
they were modified by statute to redress problems arising from the writs' extreme
technicality and unjustified narrowness. However, it is still necessary to understand the
ancient writs to understand the scope and range of remedies available on judicial review.
For example, neither the old writs nor the reform statutes, which are based on the old
writs, permit a court on judicial review to substitute its views on the substance of a matter
for the tribunal's views. The old writs also continue to operate in some provinces, albeit
in a more limited way.160
A party contemplating judicial review should also be aware that, unlike an appeal, an
application for judicial review usually does not automatically stay the enforcement of the
underlying tribunal order, although the tribunal or the court or both may have the power
to stay the tribunal's order on application.161 The legislative decision to make stays
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See, respectively, Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ, c C-25, art 846; Ontario Judicial
Review Procedure Act, supra note 143, s 2(1); and Judicial Review Act (PEI JRA),
RSPEI 1988, c J-3, s 4(2).
159

See, e.g. Volochay, supra note 12018 at para 70, Anne & Gilbert Inc v Government of
PEI, 2012 PECA 4, 320 Nfld & PEIR 99.
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For example, the "direct action in nullity" is a judicial review remedy that predates the
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ 1977, c C-25, and is not referred to in it, yet it
continues to operate: Immeubles Port Louis Ltée v Lafontaine (Village), supra note 122.
In New Brunswick, one cannot apply specifically for the traditional prerogative writs of
certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, which are now available simply as judicial review.
However, a range of "alternative" remedies echoing the old prerogative writs continues to
exist. See e.g. Sullivan v Greater Moncton Planning District Commission (1993), 132
NBR (2d) 285 (TD). Manitoba's Court of Queen's Bench Rules, Man Reg 553/88, Rule
68.01 states only that "[a] Judge on application may grant an order of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari or quo warranto." Yukon Territory has not enacted any statutory
changes to the common law writs.
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See e.g. Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act, supra note 54, s 25 (an appeal acts
as a stay, but judicial review is not an appeal for that purpose); New Brunswick Energy
and Utilities Board Act, SNB 2006, c E-9.18, s 52(2) (judicial review does not
automatically stay an order, but the board itself or the Court of Appeal may stay it).
Indeed, one federal statute that establishes securities clearing houses and banking and

automatic for many appeals but not for judicial review applications is consistent with the
"last resort" nature of judicial review. The rules regarding stays vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from tribunal to tribunal, so parties seeking a stay should be sure to
review the relevant enabling statute, as well as the rules of court and any omnibus statutes
governing procedure or judicial review.
The following sections introduce the prerogative writs and subsequent statutory
reform. Because judicial review remains a fundamentally discretionary power, the bases
on which courts have refused to grant a remedy are also discussed.
1. Introduction to the Prerogative Writs
Certiorari is the most commonly used prerogative remedy, both historically and
today. Certiorari ("cause to be certified") is a special proceeding by which a superior
court requires some inferior tribunal, board, or judicial officer to provide it with the
record of its proceedings for review for excess of jurisdiction. It was the established
method by which the Court of King's Bench in England, from earliest times, checked the
jurisdiction of inferior courts and maintained the supremacy of the royal courts. In the
United States, the vast majority of applications to the US Supreme Court are still made by
way of a petition for certiorari. A successful certiorari application results in the
"quashing" (effectively, the invalidating) of a tribunal's order or decision. It is an ex post
facto remedy. Note, however, that generally the court cannot substitute its decision for
the decision of a tribunal that the court finds had erred, because the court has not been
granted the statutory decision-making authority.162 Quashing the existing decision
effectively means that the matter is remitted to the administrative decision-maker, who
still retains the statutory jurisdiction to decide. This is what happened in Gitxaala Nation.
The related writ of prohibition is another special proceeding, issued by an
appellate court to prevent a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction, or to prevent a
non-judicial officer or entity from exercising a power. Prohibition is a kind of common
law injunction to prevent an unlawful assumption of jurisdiction. Unlike certiorari,
which provides relief after a decision is made, prohibition is used to obtain relief preemptively. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, board, or person exercising judicial
functions in a manner or by means not within its jurisdiction or discretion.

payment systems stipulates that no stay shall be granted for a judicial review application
related to the government's administration of those systems. Canadian Payments Act,
RSC 1985, c C-21, s 46.
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In exceptional circumstances, a court will nevertheless make the decision that it finds
the original tribunal ought to have made. See e.g. Renaud v Québec (Commission des
affaires sociales), [1999] 3 SCR 855, 184 DLR (4th) 441, [1999] SCJ No 70 (QL); Corp
of the Canadian Civil Liberties Assn v Ontario (Civilian Commission on Police Services)
(2002), 61 OR (3d) 649 (CA); Allman v Amacon Property Management Services Inc,
[2007] BCJ No 1144 (QL) (CA).

Mandamus (literally, "we command") is a writ issued by a superior court to
compel a lower court or a government agency to perform a duty it is mandated to
perform. It can be combined with an application for certiorari. Certiorari would be used
to quash a decision—for example, for a lack of procedural fairness—while mandamus
would be used to force the tribunal to reconsider the matter in a procedurally fair manner.
A variation on mandamus gives the court the ability to send a matter back to a tribunal
for reconsideration with directions. Superior courts have the inherent power to order
reconsideration with directions, and several provincial statutes and rules of court, as well
as the Federal Courts Act,163 also grant this power. If the court issues directions, it must
clearly state what the original panel is to do or what it must refrain from doing. These
directions may only protect against unfair procedures or excess of power and cannot tell
the tribunal how it must decide. In particular, the general rule is that mandamus cannot be
used to force an administrative decision-maker to exercise its discretion in a particular
way, although exercises of discretion cannot be unlawful and must always conform to the
constitution.164
A declaration is a judgment of a court that determines and states the legal position
of the parties, or the law that applies to them. There are two kinds of declarations: the
public law kind, used to declare some government action ultra vires, and the private law
kind, used to clarify the law or declare a private party's rights under a statute. The public
law kind is the main concern of administrative law. Declarations are not enforceable, and
they cannot require anyone to take or refrain from taking any action. Historically, this
made declarations useful in actions against the Crown itself because the traditional
common law position was that relief in the nature of mandamus was not available against
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Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7.

In the special circumstances of the so-called Insite case, which concerned a safe drug
injection site in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside neighbourhood, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the province’s Minister of Health had not exercised its discretion
consistent with the Charter when he refused to exempt Insite from certain criminal law
provisions. The Court found that sending the matter back to the Minister for
reconsideration would be inadequate in view of the attendant risks and delays, and that
“the only constitutional response to [Insite’s exemption application] was to grant it.” It
therefore took the rare step of issuing an order in the nature of mandamus, compelling the
Minister to exercise its discretion so as to issue an exemption to Insite. Canada (Attorney
General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134, para 150.
The Federal Court of Appeal has done the same in some recent cases in which it held that
there was “only one lawful way” in which the decision maker’s discretion could be
exercised: Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v LeBon, 2013 FCA 55;
or, pushing the concept further, in “exceptional” cases in which, for example, “there has
been substantial delay and the additional delay caused by remitting the matter to the
administrative decision-maker for re-decision threatens to bring the administration of
justice into disrepute”: D’Errico v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 95 at paras 1618.

the Crown. It was not thought appropriate for a court to order enforcement against the
Crown, because the Crown was the source of its own authority. (These prohibitions on
remedies against the Crown itself were substantially, though not completely, relaxed over
the course of the 20th century.) The non-coercive nature of the remedy has not often
proven to be a problem, because court declarations against government bodies in
particular tend to be respected.165 Where a declaration does not produce a government
response, however, as happened in the Khadr case,166 the declaration may look like a
distinctly second-rate remedy relative to mandamus. At least where the Crown
prerogative over foreign affairs is concerned, an aggrieved party may find himself or
herself having a right without a remedy—or, more accurately, having a right for which a
meaningful remedy exists only in the political, and not the legal, arena.
Less common these days are the writs of habeas corpus and quo warranto.
Habeas corpus (literally, "produce the body") is a writ employed to bring a person before
a court, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is not
illegal. Like certiorari, habeas corpus continues to live an active life in the United States,
where it is the primary mechanism for challenging state-level death penalty sentences in
the federal courts. In Canada, habeas corpus applications are fairly rare. Most are brought
by prisoners detained in correctional institutions and by police, immigration, child
welfare, and mental health detainees. Unlike the other prerogative writs, habeas corpus is
not inherently discretionary. It issues “as of right if the applicant proves a deprivation of
liberty and raises a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of the
deprivation.”167 Quo warranto ("by what warrant?" or "by what authority?") is a writ
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Lount Corp v Canada (Attorney General), [1984] 1 FC 332 at 365 (TD) (noting that
"by long tradition, the executive abides by declarations of the Court even though not
formally or specifically directed to do so"); aff'd sub nom Canada (Attorney General) v
Lount Corp, [1985] 2 FCR 185.
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Khadr, supra note 87. In 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada determined that Omar
Khadr had been deprived of his s 7 Charter rights by Canadian officials operating at the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility, who shared transcripts of their interviews of Mr.
Khadr with US authorities. The Court ordered that the Canadian authorities produce those
transcripts to Mr. Khadr, which they did, but the Prime Minister refused requests to seek
his repatriation from the United States to Canada. In its 2010 decision, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that, notwithstanding the violation of Mr. Khadr's s 7 Charter rights, it
would not order the Canadian government to request his repatriation. In light of the
Crown prerogative over foreign affairs, the court concluded that the appropriate remedy
was a declaration that Canada had infringed Mr. Khadr's s 7 rights, leaving it to the
government to decide how best to respond. The government did not seek Mr. Khadr's
repatriation.
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Khela, supra note 121 at para 41. In other ways, as well, habeas corpus has developed
to be a speedier and more accessible remedy for those who claim to have been unlawfully

used to inquire into what authority existed to justify acts by or powers claimed by a
public office. It is rarely used today, and some provinces have abolished it by statute.168
2.

Statutory Reform

Over time, each of the prerogative writs above came to be characterized by
technical complexity and arcane rules. Potentially meritorious applications were
dismissed because the applicant had petitioned for the wrong writ, or because the claim
was barred by some technical limitation. For example, although court decisions later reexpanded the writ's scope, a number of cases in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s held that
certiorari and prohibition were only available to address "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" (as
opposed to “administrative”) final decisions that affected the rights of citizens. As the
case law became more arcane and the practical injustices more obvious, policy reasons
for maintaining the distinction between the various writs eroded.
The result, in many provinces and at the Federal Court,169 was statutory reform.
Some provinces enacted omnibus statutes governing judicial review or statutory/civil

deprived of their liberty. Ibid at paras 38-50. On the Federal Court’s jurisdiction, see also
infra note 169.
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E.g. PEI JRA, supra note 162, s 11; BC Judicial Review Procedure Act (BCJRPA),
RSBC 1996, c 241, s 18. These statutes provide that certain remedies for what would
have been an information in the nature of quo warranto are still available. However, quo
warranto is still used in Quebec and New Brunswick to challenge the authority of
municipal councillors on the basis of a prohibited conflict of interest. See e.g. R v
Wheeler, [1979] 2 SCR 650.
169

Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18(1) provides that the Federal Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction "to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of
prohibition, writ of mandamus, or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief,
against any federal board, commission or other tribunal." Note that habeas corpus is not
included in the list. Jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus in, e.g. federal penitentiaries,
which are otherwise subject to Federal Court review, remains with the provincial superior
courts: Khela, supra note 1321 at paras 31-35.

procedure,170 while others used their rules of court to enact changes.171 Only Yukon
Territory seems to have left the common law untouched. The details vary from one
statutory scheme to another, but key statutes that may apply are the Federal Courts Act,
the Ontario and BC Judicial Review Procedure Acts (JRPAs), the Ontario Statutory
Powers Procedure Act, the BC Administrative Tribunals Act, the PEI Judicial Review
Act, Quebec's Code of Civil Procedure, and the rules of court in other provinces and
territories. These important statutes have sought to clarify procedure surrounding judicial
review. Some have also sought to change the substantive shape of judicial review itself.
Therefore, parties considering challenging a tribunal order must be aware of the relevant
statutes' provisions, in addition to the provisions of the tribunal's own enabling statutes.
Statutory reforms commonly provide for the following:
1.
Simplified application procedures. For example, a statute may state that
applications for orders "in the nature of" mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari shall be
deemed to be applications for judicial review, to be brought by way of an originating
notice or petition. The new judicial review application combines, and in the process
supersedes, the old writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, public law declaration,
and injunction. (Some statutes include quo warranto and habeas corpus within the ambit
of the statute; some abolish quo warranto; some provinces have a dedicated Habeas
Corpus Act.) It is sufficient for a party to set out the grounds on which relief is sought
and the nature of the relief sought, without having to specify under which particular writ
they might have proceeded at common law.
2.
Simplified remedies including, for example, the power to set aside a
decision or direct the tribunal to reconsider its decision, with or without directions. Some
statutes also expressly give courts the authority to ignore technical irregularities or
defects in form if the court finds no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has
occurred.
3.
Greater clarity as to who may be parties to a hearing—for example,
decision-makers whose exercise of statutory authority is being questioned. Generally,
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Ontario JRPA, supra note 125, BCJRPA, supra note 149, PEI JRA, supra note 162,
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ, c C-25. Ontario and British Columbia have
enacted the most comprehensive reforms. Be aware that, apart from habeas corpus,
terminology in Quebec is different. For example, prohibition and certiorari are codified
under "evocation" and "revision" in s 846 of the Civil Code. Remedies equivalent to quo
warranto and mandamus are codified under ss 838 and 844ff, respectively, and the terms
"quo warranto" and "mandamus" are used in practice, but they do not appear in the Code.
There also exists the "declaratory judgment in motion," codified at s 453, which allows a
party to have their rights "declared."
171

Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, Nova
Scotia, Nunavut, and Saskatchewan.

judicial review statutes also provide that notice must be given to the Attorney General,
who is entitled as of right to be heard on the application.
4.
A right of appeal. Judicial review applications are generally made to
provincial superior courts, and the statutes provide for a subsequent right of appeal to the
provincial Court of Appeal.
5.
Judicial review mechanisms to challenge interlocutory orders and to
resolve interim issues. At common law, certiorari was only available with respect to
"decisions"—that is, final orders. However, the BC and Ontario JRPAs use the words
"exercise of statutory power," rather than the word "decision," thereby expanding the
range of judicial review to include any exercise of statutory power.172 Other statutes
permit a tribunal itself to refer a "stated case" to the courts for determination of a question
of law, after which the case can go back to the original tribunal for determination of the
ultimate issues.173 For example, BC tribunals that do not have jurisdiction over
constitutional questions under the ATA can issue a stay and refer a constitutional
question to a court of competent jurisdiction.174 Enabling statutes must authorize stated
cases.
F. Private Law Remedies
As noted above, a tribunal’s enabling statute may give it the power to order a range of
remedies, including money damages. Courts on judicial review do not have the same
ability. The difficulty is that neither the old prerogative writs, nor the new statutory
remedy of judicial review, allow a party to obtain monetary relief through judicial
review. In some circumstances, unhappy parties would probably prefer monetary relief to
any other remedy. Attempts to obtain private law remedies from public bodies has put
considerable momentum behind the development of the law in this area, and courts have
responded in two main ways.
The first has been to clarify and elaborate upon those instances where public bodies,
like administrative agencies, can be subject to purely private law remedies outside the
scope of administrative action and judicial review. The Crown and its servants can be
liable to private parties for monetary relief,175 although some statutes limit individual
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BCJRPA, supra note 171, s 3; Ontario JRPA, supra note 143, s 2.
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E.g. Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18.3; BC ATA, supra note 15, s 43.
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BC ATA, ibid, ss 44, 45.
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The Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction over all actions for damages
against the federal Crown. See supra note 143. Individual servants of the Crown,
including ministers, are also liable for breaches of private law duties on the same basis as
other individuals. However, “core policy matters” are protected from suit: R v Imperial

administrative tribunal members' liability.176 However, to seek monetary relief, an
aggrieved party must initiate a separate civil action for restitution or damages alongside,
or in lieu of, a judicial review application.
Government agencies can be sued, for example, for breach of contract, for the tort of
negligence, or the special tort of misfeasance in (or abuse of) public office. The first two
are straightforward private law actions. The third, as a potential source of money
damages against public actors acting in their public capacity, has attracted some interest
lately. The threshold is high, however. To succeed in an action for tort of misfeasance in
public office, the plaintiff must establish, in addition to the basic elements of negligence,
(1) deliberate and unlawful conduct by someone in public office, and (2) the public
officer's subjective knowledge that the conduct was unlawful and likely to harm the
plaintiff. Because this tort alleges bad faith on the part of a public official, "clear proof
commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong" is required.177 Because a public officer
must be able to make decisions that are adverse to some peoples’ interests, in the service
of broader public policy goals, mere knowledge of that harm is insufficient. The public
officer must “deliberately engage in conduct that he or she knows to be inconsistent with
the obligations of the office.”178
The leading case on the tort of misfeasance in public office, Odhavji, involved an
action for damages against police officers and the chief of the Metropolitan Toronto
Police by the estate of an individual shot by the police. The plaintiffs alleged that the
police officers involved in the shooting did not promptly or fully comply with their
statutory duty to cooperate with an ensuing investigation, and that the chief of police did
not adequately compel them to cooperate. The case made its way to the Supreme Court of
Canada on the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim, where the court
determined that the plaintiff had made out a cause of action and that the matter should be
allowed to proceed. In other words, the court held that there was such a thing as the tort
of misfeasance in public office. Subsequent cases have considered allegations of tort of
misfeasance in public office against a range of public actors including provincial and

Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 SCR 45 at para 90. A more in-depth
discussion is contained in Chapter 11, Crown Liability and Administrative Law.
176

E.g. BC ATA, supra note 15, s 56.

177

Powder Mountain Resorts Ltd v British Columbia, 2001 BCCA 619 at para 8.

178

Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 SCR 263 at para 28. On the
tort's value as a practical tool for enhancing state accountability in the UK context,
notwithstanding its rather poor fit with the conceptual underpinnings of modern tort law,
see John Murphy, "Misfeasance in a Public Office: A Tort Law Misfit?" (2012) 32
Oxford J Leg Stud 51.

federal departments or ministries, federal penitentiary staff, hospital boards, and racing
commissions. 179
As these cases make clear, some torts overlap with a potential judicial review
application while others do not. Judicial review was not a possibility in a case like
Odhavji, because there was no administrative decision to challenge. It was about police
action. In other cases, like one involving Health Canada’s handling of a drug approval
application, or a hospital board’s revocation of a doctor’s privileges, an administrative
actor’s conduct may be precisely what is being challenged.
The relationship and potential overlap between private rights of action and judicial
review applications was a cause for concern for a number of years. Then, in 2010, in a
case concerning private law claims for breach of contract, negligence, and unjust
enrichment, the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that parties do not need to seek
judicial review before they can bring a private law action for damages, and the private
law action does not constitute a collateral attack on government conduct.180 Alexander
Pless discusses this and other cases in greater detail in Chapter 10, Crown Liability for
Negligent Administrative Action.Following TeleZone, if a party has a fundamentally
private law claim arising from an administrative decision, and primarily wants monetary
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Some have succeeded, including Apotex Inc v Canada, 2017 FCA 73 (Health Canada
deliberately evaluated drug approval application against inappropriate standard, and
attempted to conceal or dissemble that fact); Rosenhek v Windsor Regional Hospital,
2010 ONCA 13, [2010] OJ No 129 (QL), leave to appeal refused, [2010] SCCA No 89
(hospital revoked doctor’s privileges for ulterior purpose, not for the public good, and in
bad faith); Ontario Racing Commission v O'Dwyer, 2008 ONCA 446, 293 DLR (4th) 559
(Racing Commission frustrated raceway employee’s efforts to pursue a complaint about
Commission employee’s prior conduct, which had led to employee’s firing); JP v British
Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2015 BCSC 1216 (Ministry employee
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unlawfully and not in best interests of the children); McMaster v The Queen, 2009 FC
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exercising). See also Carhoun & Sons Enterprises Ltd v Canada (Attorney General),
2015 BCCA 163 (motion to strike dismissed, where respondent alleged unreasonable
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see, e.g. Harrison v British Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2010 BCCA
220, 319 DLR (4th) 251, leave to appeal refused, [2010] SCCA No 293 (no evidence of
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TeleZone, supra note 142. The courts retain the residual discretion to stay a damages
action if the claim being made is actually "in its essential character" an application for
judicial review. TeleZone, ibid at para 78; on this point see also Manuge v Canada, 2010
SCC 67, another of the five companion cases released alongside TeleZone.

damages, that party may proceed directly by way of private action. As Binnie J points
out, though, "no amount of artful pleading in a damages case will succeed in setting aside
the order said to have harmed the claimant or enjoin its enforcement. … The claimant
must … be content to take its money (if successful) and walk away leaving the order
standing."181 Note that, while TeleZone makes clear that parties do not need to seek
judicial review before they can bring an action for damages, that case still allows the
Crown to raise the legality of the decision as a defence to the damages action.182
A second and genuinely novel response to the question of when damages could be
available against administrative authorities would be to develop a claim for monetary
relief grounded entirely in public, as opposed to private, law. This is what a majority of
the Federal Court of Appeal recently did, in obiter, in Paradis Honey.183
The case involved a claim by a group of Canadian beekeepers that the respondents,
the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-food and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency,
were negligent in imposing a blanket prohibition on importing honey bee “packages”
from the United States. (Bees can be imported in “packages,” which hold a queen and a
small colony, or simply as a “queen,” a much smaller container holding a queen bee and a
few attendant bees. Replacing a failed bee colony with a package, as opposed to a queen,
is more efficient and less risky.) The appellant beekeepers argued that the Minister had
adopted a blanket policy of issuing no permits for importing bee packages, even though
the relevant statute and regulations gave the Minister the authority to issue permits to
import animals (in this case, bees) in any kind of packaging so long as doing so would
not introduce disease or toxic substances into Canada. The appellants argued that the
prohibition exceeded the Minister’s lawful authority. They further argued that in
prohibiting packages while still permitting queens to be imported, the respondents were
using their permit-granting authority in bad faith or for an improper purpose, and
impermissibly favouring some parts of the Canadian beekeeping community over others.
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TeleZone, supra note 142 at para 46. The precise role of legality or illegality in an
action for damages is a little more complicated in practice than this, and is explored in
more detail in Chapter 11.
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Paradis Honey Ltd v Canada, 2015 FCA 89, 382 DLR (4th) 720. The majority’s
reasons (by Stratas JA for himself and Nadon JA) were based on the beekeepers’ claims
in negligence and bad faith against the respondents: see paras 88-111 (among other
things, forcefully criticizing the ban on private suits against government “policy”
decisions, following Imperial Tobacco, supra note 175 at paras 102-110). The majority
then went on to observe that “were it necessary,” they would also have concluded that the
facts pleaded supported a claim for monetary relief in public law. Pelletier JA, dissenting,
would have confirmed the Federal Court’s dismissal of the beekeepers’ statement of
claim. The matter was subsequently certified as a class action: Paradis Honey Ltd v
Canada, 2017 FC 199.

The decision occurred at the motion to dismiss stage, meaning that the majority of the
Federal Court of Appeal held only that, assuming the facts as pleaded were all true, it was
not plain and obvious that the appellant beekeepers’ claims would fail.
The appellants sought money damages to compensate them for the costs they incurred
as a result of the blanket prohibition on importing bee packages. Because they were
seeking damages, they had to establish a claim in private law—in this case, primarily in
negligence.184 As the majority pointed out in obiter, the tort of negligence is indeed a
poor fit for a situation in which parties have been harmed by impermissible government
action. It is grounded in proximity and the concept of what one owes to one’s
neighbour—admittedly, a strange way to conceptualize the relationship between citizens
and the state.185 To make a claim, therefore, the appellants had to plead that their rights
were particularly well-defined, based on specific legislative criteria, and that the
respondents had specifically assured them that imports that affected their economic
interests would only be banned where there was scientific evidence of risk.186
After dealing with the negligence claim, the majority of the court goes on to consider
a matter not pleaded: the novel possibility of a public law claim for monetary damages,
which the majority describes as a “responsible, incremental change to the common law
founded upon legal doctrine and achieved through accepted pathways of legal reasoning
… [which] does not throw into doubt the outcomes of previous cases, but rather offers
better explanations for them, leading us to a more understandable, more coherent law of
liability for public authorities.”187 Rather than trying to adapt ill-fitting private law
principles to public law contexts (or, in their words, “using a screwdriver to turn a
bolt”188), the majority argues for drawing on underlying principles of administrative law
and judicial review to create a new test: that as a matter of public law, courts should grant
relief, including monetary relief, when (1) “a public law authority acts unacceptably or
indefensibly in the administrative law sense,” and when (2) “as a matter of discretion, a
remedy should be granted.”189 The majority insists that, the limits of the prerogative writs
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and judicial review aside, underlying public law principles support courts’ discretion to
grant monetary relief. Moreover, there are times when the goal of adequately
compensating the harmed, or perhaps the quality of a public authority’s conduct (if it is,
for example, exceptionally poor or clearly in violation of a duty), justifies a court
exercising its discretion to grant a new species of public law monetary damages.
The obiter in Paradis Honey has begun to provoke discussion, as was surely its
intention, not only about the imperfections of existing private law jurisprudence vis-à-vis
public actors, but also about the public law foundations on which administrative law
rests, and about the limits of the prerogative writs and judicial review.190 It is too soon to
say whether Justice Stratas’s argument in favour of a public law monetary damages
remedy will gain traction. What we can say at this stage is that the proposed change
would not be incremental, at least at the level of theory. At the level of application,
though, it may be: recognizing a public law remedy in money damages may actually
provide us with a more coherent and explicit explanation for outcomes that courts already
sometimes reach. Given the ongoing desire by parties for a remedy in money damages
and given the narrowness of the tort of misfeasance in public office, we can expect more
action around this issue.
V.

Conclusion

A goal of this chapter has been to locate judicial review within the larger
administrative law landscape. By understanding the concerns that animate administrative
law generally, we can begin to understand the outlines of this parallel universe of actions
and remedies. Administrative law remedies are the product of history, and of democratic
and rule-of-law priorities, often acting in tension with each other. They need to be
considered in light of the tug of war between courts and legislators as demonstrated by,
textbook. Basically, it usually requires that the administrative actor act outside the range
of reasonableness. The content of the second requirement—the fact that judicial review
and its remedies are discretionary—has been discussed above.
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See e.g. Patrong v Banks, 2015 ONSC 3078 at paras 69-78 (partially endorsing the
majority’s argument and arguing for a broader understanding of the state’s private law
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for example, legislators' creation of internal appeal mechanisms and courts' periodic
circumvention of those internal appeals in favour of immediate judicial review. Another
recurring theme is the tug of war between tribunals and the courts that oversee them, in
terms of courts' willingness to recognize and give effect to potentially creative and
uncourtlike tribunal remedies. These tensions are emblematic of a deeper contest between
deeply held values around the rule of law on the one hand, and administrative expertise,
efficiency, and democratic accountability on the other.
Administrative law remedies are also path-dependent, meaning that they have been
shaped by their historical origins in the prerogative writs and by subsequent, sometimes
piecemeal, attempts to modify judicial review. If we were to design a set of remedies out
of whole cloth today, it is not obvious that we would decide to set up two separate
mechanisms for accessing the courts (that is, statutory appeals and judicial review). We
might create an overarching administrative review tribunal like Quebec's instead.
Perhaps, as well, there was an earlier juncture at which we could have developed a public
law remedy for monetary damages, and perhaps it would have spared us a bit of
confusing caselaw along the way. Freed of the historical baggage of the prerogative writs,
a court might have even imposed monetary damages on the Crown for its failure to
consult and accommodate in the Gitxaala Nation case. Yet without genuinely sweeping
reform, administrative law remedies will continue to be influenced by their historical
roots, and the scope of those remedies in turn will continue to influence the development
of administrative law as a whole. Even as these remedies continue to evolve, they will be
informed by the particular history and rules that govern this parallel legal universe.
In part as a corrective to the heavy conventional emphasis on judicial review and its
idiosyncrasies, this chapter tries to situate judicial review remedies within a larger
context. Myriad other remedies are available at different stages of administrative action.
Rich debate exists concerning appropriate tribunal functioning and the proper scope of
tribunal action. Tribunals develop remedies that are novel, by court standards, because
they are differently constituted than courts are. It is in part the heterogeneity and depth of
this experience that underlies the modern instinct that courts should show some respectful
deference in exercising judicial review of tribunal decisions. Regardless of how we may
feel about any particular decision, this chapter also counsels respect for that difference. A
conversation about administrative law remedies illustrates the larger point that animates
much of this volume: judicial review and court-centred processes, which make up the
bulk of this book, are nevertheless just one, final stage of administrative law and practice.
It should not limit our appreciation of, and approach to, the complex and varied forms
that front-line administrative action can represent.
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